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FORFEITURE OF THE CONFRONTATION 
RIGHT IN GILES: JUSTICE SCALIA’S 
FAINT-HEARTED FIDELITY TO THE 
COMMON LAW 
ELLEN LIANG YEE*
In Giles v. California
 
1 the Supreme Court issued a third Confrontation 
Clause opinion in its Crawford line of cases.2  In an opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, the Giles Court reiterated its interpretive approach in 
Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a 
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding.”3  The Court’s decision 
purports to hold that a defendant does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the 
defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial, unless the judge 
finds that the defendant’s wrongful act was done with an intent to make the 
witness unavailable to testify.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion interprets 
intent to require purpose, only recognizing the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception to the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation requirement when the 
defendant “engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying.”4
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.  J.D., University of 
Minnesota Law School.  B.A., Yale University.  Thanks to Ian Bartrum, Laurie Doré, 
Charles Ehrhardt, George Fisher, Richard Friedman, Mark Kende, David Markell, David 
McCord, Robert Mosteller, Margaret Raymond, Jim Rossi, Christopher Slobogin, Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, and John Yetter for their comments on the paper. 
 
1 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
2 In Crawford v. Washington, the Court articulated a new approach, holding that 
admission of an extrajudicial testimonial statement by an unavailable declarant-witness 
violated the Confrontation Clause unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant.  541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).  In Davis v. Washington, the Court began to 
provide a more comprehensive definition of “testimonial” by delineating which police 
interrogations invoke the protection of the Confrontation Clause.  547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
3 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 64). 
4 Id. at 2683. 
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In this Article, I demonstrate that the historical sources do not point 
unequivocally to the conclusion Justice Scalia reaches in his majority 
opinion.  Further, given the fragmented opinions of the Justices in the case, 
I argue that the reasoning of the case should be construed on the narrowest 
grounds of commonality among the Justices.  In so doing, courts should 
examine intent in a more expansive way in light of the common law, rather 
than in the rigid way described in Justice Scalia’s opinion.  Especially in 
cases involving domestic violence, gangs, and other cases involving 
complex relationship dynamics between the defendant and the witness, a 
defendant’s conduct that knowingly leads to the witness’s unavailability can 
and should still trigger forfeiture, even if there is no overt purposive intent. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”5  For many years, the Confrontation Clause was interpreted to 
protect against admission of unreliable evidence under Ohio v. Roberts and 
its progeny.6  In Crawford v. Washington, a landmark opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, the Court denounced the unpredictability of the Roberts 
approach, which based the protection of the Sixth Amendment on the 
“vagaries of the rules of evidence” and “amorphous notions of 
‘reliability.’”7  Crawford concluded that the Sixth Amendment bars 
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at 
trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”8
During the six years following Crawford, unpredictability has plagued 
lower courts deciding evidence issues in criminal law cases.  Much of this 
lack of predictability centers on Crawford’s unnecessarily (and self-




5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
  Widespread disagreement 
among lower courts in their application of Crawford has gradually required 
the Court to start outlining the contours of what kinds of statements are 
6 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  In Roberts, the Court established a two-pronged 
test to determine the admissibility of an unavailable declarant-witness’s former statement 
offered against a criminal defendant.  First, the prosecution must demonstrate the declarant’s 
unavailability. Second, the hearsay statement may be admissible only if the statement bears 
adequate “indicia of reliability” by either falling within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” 
or bearing “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id. at 65–66. 
7 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.   
8 Id. at 53–54. 
9 Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition 
of ‘testimonial.’”). 
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“testimonial.”  For example, two years after Crawford, the Supreme Court 
offered some guidance in Davis v. Washington by defining more 
specifically which police interrogations invoke the protection of the 
Confrontation Clause.10
One such uncertainty relates to what is known as the “forfeiture by 
wrongdoing” doctrine.  In evidence law, hearsay statements that are 
ordinarily excluded may be admissible if the declarant is rendered 
unavailable to be a trial witness due to the defendant’s wrongdoing.
  But other important uncertainties have continued 
to plague the Court’s new framework under Crawford. 
11  This 
exception has particularly important consequences where a witness is also a 
victim, as is frequently the situation in domestic violence and child abuse 
cases.  In the constitutional context, the Crawford court suggested there 
may be historical exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that are unrelated 
to the Roberts reliability rationale.12  For example, if declarants are 
rendered unavailable by the defendant’s wrongdoing, their testimonial 
hearsay statements may be admissible under the equitable rule of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing.13  As in the exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule 
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), the rationale for admitting 
such evidence is not based on the theory that it is more reliable, but on the 
grounds that the defendant should not benefit from his own wrongdoing.14
 
10 547 U.S. 813 (2006); see also Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the Ongoing Emergency: 
A Pragmatic Approach to Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 729, 760–75, 785–92 (2008) (discussing how Crawford and Davis provide 
only partial guidance to lower courts on these issues). 
  
Following Crawford, many courts also used the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine to admit testimonial statements, but did so inconsistently.  For 
example, some courts required proof that the defendant intended to render 
11 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).  The rule applies to all parties in both civil and criminal 
proceedings.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (1997) (“The wrongdoing 
need not consist of a criminal act.”). 
12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; see also id. at 55 n.6 (suggesting that testimonial dying 
declarations may be a sui generis exception).   
13 Id. at 62 (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes 
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative 
means of determining reliability.”) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 
(1879)). 
14 Id.  The rule “recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent 
behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.’”  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) 
advisory committee’s note (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984)). 
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the victim unavailable as a trial witness, while other courts did not require 
such proof.15
In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court issued another Confrontation 
Clause opinion written by Justice Scalia.
 
16  The Giles Court reiterated its 
interpretive approach in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most 
naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, 
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.”17  
Imposing that historical limitation on the scope of exceptions, the Court 
held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was only an exception to the 
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation requirement when the defendant 
“engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.”18
Given the methodological preference for constitutional originalism in 
Crawford, Davis, and Giles—particularly as reflected in Justice Scalia’s 
opinions—this Article analyzes whether the historical claim underlying the 
Court’s opinion in Giles is sound.
  In 
other words, a defendant does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the 
defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial, unless the judge 
finds that the defendant’s wrongful act was for the purpose of making the 
witness unavailable to testify. 
19
 
15 Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing 
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 871–74 (2009).  A majority of state courts did not 
require proof of specific intent to silence a witness for forfeiture if the prosecution could 
show that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the witness.  However some courts 
did require the prosecution to prove the specific intent to silence a witness in non-homicide 
and homicide cases.  Id.; see also Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is 
the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759, 779 (2007) (“After Davis, courts 
have continued to approve of the use of forfeiture in murders implicating domestic violence 
without requiring any intent to prohibit [victims] from testifying at trial.”). 
  An accurate assessment of the history 
requires an analysis of whether forfeiture of Sixth Amendment 
16 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
17 Id. at 2682 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54). 
18 Id. at 2683. 
19 Many scholars have analyzed and critiqued Justice Scalia’s use of originalism in 
criminal procedure.  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal 
Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 
GEO. L.J. 183 (2005).  In his 1988 lecture at the University of Cincinnati, Justice Scalia 
himself discussed the merits and defects of originalism and nonoriginalism.  Conceding that 
“public flogging and hand branding” would not be sustained in present-day courts under the 
Eighth Amendment even though these would not have been “cruel and unusual 
punishments” at the time of the founding, he acknowledged that such an interpretation would 
be “faint-hearted” originalism.  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 849, 861–62 (1989); see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of 
“Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L.REV. 7 (2006). 
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confrontation rights by wrongdoing requires proof of “intent” as understood 
at the time of the founding.  Understanding that this issue involves not only 
constitutional law, but also evidence law and substantive criminal law, this 
Article analyzes how all three bodies of law inform the interpretive question 
presented by this issue.  If the history is approached through the common 
law, properly assessed, Giles’ very methodology does not clearly support its 
outcome or the Court’s limited approach to forfeiture. 
Part II will describe and discuss the recent line of Confrontation 
Clause cases including Giles.  Justice Scalia has taken the lead in directing 
the Court down a new path of Confrontation Clause interpretation.  
Beginning in Crawford and continuing in Davis and Giles, Justice Scalia’s 
new framework has profoundly altered criminal trial procedure.20
Part III will briefly trace the development of the right of confrontation 
from English and American sources of law.  This Part will focus on 
confrontation issues surrounding and including the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception. 
  
However, beneath the surface of the Court’s six to three ruling on the 
outcome, the Giles Court was more fractured in its reasoning than the vote 
tally indicates on its face. 
Part IV examines the historic and contemporary legal resources 
regarding the mental state element.  This Part will look not only at 
constitutional law, but also at evidence law and substantive criminal law to 
analyze the Giles Court’s interpretation of the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine.  By referencing these other related areas of law, this Part will 
provide a more broad-based, solid foundation supported by the history of 
the common law for lower courts to use as they are deciding whether the 
prosecution has sufficiently shown that the defendant’s right to 
confrontation should be forfeited. 
Part V concludes by warning that constitutional interpretation of 
criminal procedure cannot be divorced from a fair understanding of the 
common law.  That understanding cannot be reached through an inference 
about the common law’s meaning based on assumptions about the legal 
system, especially based on the lack of cases addressing issues that were 
unlikely to have been litigated.  Courts and litigants addressing forfeiture 
would be ill-advised to rigidly apply the rule set forth by Justice Scalia’s 
 
20 During this period, the Court had also decided in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford 
did not apply retroactively on collateral review.  549 U.S. 406, 409 (2007).  Since Giles, the 
Court decided two cases on a related issue and two more cases are pending.  See infra notes 
43 and 45.  Also, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed.  Since Crawford, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor are no longer on the Court, and since Giles 
and Melendez-Diaz, Justices Souter and Stevens are no longer on the Court. 
1500 ELLEN LIANG YEE [Vol. 100 
majority opinion in Giles without taking into account the proper common 
law understanding of intent in the forfeiture context. 
II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TRILOGY 
The significance of the Confrontation Clause in American 
jurisprudence greatly expanded in 1965 when the Court incorporated the 
Sixth Amendment via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applied it to the states.21  In the fifteen years following 
incorporation, the Court addressed several interpretation and application 
issues.22  In the landmark case Ohio v. Roberts, the Court addressed 
recurring issues regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence by creating 
a two-prong test requiring both unavailability and reliability as predicates to 
admission.23  To prove reliability, the Court determined that the evidence 
must either “fall[] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”24  Finding that the 
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are “designed to protect similar 
values”25 and “stem from the same roots,”26 the Roberts Court constructed 
an analysis that used the rules of hearsay as a means of determining the 
constitutional admissibility of evidence.  As the Court viewed the function 
of the Confrontation Clause primarily as a safeguard against unreliable 
evidence, it gradually diminished the unavailability requirement.27
 
21 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
  In the 
cases following Roberts, the Court continued to entwine the constitutional 
issue of confrontation with the evidentiary issue of hearsay reliability.  As 
this doctrine developed, many criticized it for diminishing defendants’ 
22 See e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (holding that when the declarant 
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints on the 
use of his prior testimonial statements); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (declaring that 
admission of an accomplice’s spontaneous comment that indirectly inculpated the defendant 
did not violate the Confrontation Clause). 
23 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
24 Id. at 66. 
25 Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)). 
26 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)). 
27 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).  Where the four-year-old child abuse victim did 
not testify at trial, the trial court did not make any finding that she was unavailable.  Id. at 
350.  The Court held that the admission of the child’s hearsay statements under the 
spontaneous declaration exception and the medical examination exception did not violate the 
defendant’s confrontation rights.  Id. at 348–51.  The Court restricted the Roberts holding to 
its facts stating: “Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary 
part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements 
were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.”  Id. at 354 (citing United States v. 
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)). 
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rights to confrontation and for determining reliability with a standard that 
was vague, arbitrary, and subjective.28  Beginning with Crawford, the Court 
has redirected the focus of its Confrontation Clause analysis to the common 
law.  Claiming that the Confrontation Clause “is most naturally read as a 
reference to the right of confrontation at common law,” the Court has 
attempted to outline the scope of that common law right and admit “only 
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.”29
A. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
 
In Crawford v. Washington, the Court reevaluated its approach to the 
Confrontation Clause and shifted the focus of the Clause from functioning 
as a judicially-determined safeguard against unreliable evidence to 
operating as a procedural trial right.30  In reviewing the history of the 
Clause for clues to its intended meaning, the Court determined that “the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil 
law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.”31
In Crawford, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment barred 
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at 
 
 
28 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1011 (1998); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth 
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 (1988); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation 
Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. 
REV. 537 (2003). 
29 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004); see also id. at 43 (“The founding 
generation’s immediate source of the concept . . . was the common law.”). 
30 541 U.S. at 42.  Justice Scalia wrote for the majority.  Id. at 38.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred with the judgment but disagreed with the 
reformation of the Court’s approach to the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 69 (“I dissent from 
the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts.”).  The facts of Crawford are as follows: 
Michael Crawford was accused of stabbing a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife, 
Sylvia.  Id. at 38.  Michael and Sylvia were arrested, taken to the police station, and 
individually questioned.  Id.  Sylvia’s statement arguably suggested that Michael was the 
aggressor and that the victim did not reach for, or did not have, a weapon at the time of the 
stabbing.  Id. at 39.  At trial, Michael claimed the stabbing was in self-defense.  Id. at 40.  He 
asserted his evidentiary marital privilege and prevented Sylvia from testifying.  Id. (citing 
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)).  Unable to call her as a witness, the prosecution 
sought to use Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement to rebut the defense.  Id.  The trial court 
admitted Sylvia’s statement under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest 
and held that it bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” therefore it did not violate 
the Confrontation Clause as construed in Roberts.  Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 
66 (1980)). 
31 Id. at 50. 
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trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”32  While the rule appears strikingly 
simple, its application has been anything but simple and clear.  Crawford 
did not provide courts sufficient guidance in determining which statements 
are “testimonial,” and thus implicate the Confrontation Clause.33
Furthermore, the Crawford Court suggested some exceptions might 
apply to the testimonial rule.  First, the Court acknowledged the 
longstanding exception to the hearsay rule for dying declarations.
 
34  
Conceding that they may be testimonial, the Court declined to make an 
explicit exception to the application of the Confrontation Clause for dying 
declarations in Crawford.35
 
32 Id. at 53–54. But see id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“The Court’s distinction 
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted 
in history than our current doctrine.”). 
  Nevertheless, it indicated that such a singular 
33 The Crawford Court decided that it would “leave for another day any effort to spell 
out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”  Id. at 68.  Nevertheless, the Court 
described three formulations of “this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.”  First, “ex parte 
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially” is 
testimonial.  Id. at 51 (emphasis added).  Second, “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions’” are testimonial.  Id. at 51–52 (emphasis added) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 
U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).  Third, “statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial” are testimonial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 
(emphasis added).  In Davis, the Court noted that the Crawford Court had “found it 
unnecessary to endorse any of” those formulations.  547 U.S. at 822.  Later, in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court stated that the Crawford Court’s opinion “described the 
class of testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause” in those three 
formulations.  129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009). 
34 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.  Note some jurisdictions further limit the use of such 
statements in criminal cases to homicide prosecutions while others do not.  See e.g., FED. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(2) (“Statement under belief of impending death.  In a prosecution for homicide 
or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant 
believed to be impending death.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (“Evidence of a statement made 
by a dying person respecting the cause and circumstances of his death is not made 
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement was made upon his personal knowledge and 
under a sense of immediately impending death.”); see also Peter Nicolas, ‘I’m Dying to Tell 
You What Happened’: The Admissibility of Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 
37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 504–06 (2010) (analyzing the various definitions of dying 
declarations in both constitutional and evidentiary contexts). 
35 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, n.6. 
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exception might be accepted on historical grounds.36  Second, the Court 
suggested that some testimonial statements may be admitted based on the 
equitable principle underlying the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.37
B. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
 
Two years later, the Supreme Court offered some guidance in Davis v. 
Washington by outlining more specifically which police interrogations 
invoke the protection of the Confrontation Clause.38  Under Davis, a court 
must determine the primary purpose of the police interrogation by 
objectively evaluating whether the circumstances indicate an “ongoing 
emergency.”39  The Court in Davis held that “[s]tatements are 
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”40  In contrast, the Court found that “[statements] are 
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”41





36 Id. (“We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an 
exception for testimonial dying declarations.  If this exception must be accepted on historical 
grounds, it is sui generis.”).  Professor Friedman has offered a more theoretically sound basis 
for the admissibility of testimonial dying declarations that is based on the rule of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing.  Richard Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. 
REV. 506 (1997). 
 the Supreme Court continues to be called into the 
fray to settle differences among courts about where to define the contours of 
37 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.  The Court noted, “For example, the rule of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”  Id. (citing 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)). 
38 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
39 Id. at 822. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 The Crawford Court acknowledged that, in White v. Illinois, it had rejected the theory 
that the Confrontation Clause was applicable only to testimonial statements.  541 U.S. at 61 
(citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352–53 (1992)).  However, in a footnote in Davis, the 
Court expressed for the first time that it “overruled Roberts in Crawford by restoring the 
unavailability and cross-examination requirements.”  547 U.S. at 825 n.4.  To reinforce its 
intentions, the Court in Whorton v. Bockting confirmed it intended to overrule Roberts in 
Crawford. 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007) (holding that Crawford did not apply retroactively on 
collateral review). 
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testimonial statements.43  In Crawford, Justice Scalia criticized the Court’s 
reliability analysis in Ohio v. Roberts for being “inherently, and therefore 
permanently, unpredictable.”44  Unfortunately, as Justice Thomas foresaw, 
the Davis majority’s primary-purpose test is no more predictable than the 
Roberts reliability inquiry.45
 
43 For example, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts the Court recently held that a 
laboratory report is testimonial.  129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).  Four days later, the Court 
granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia to resolve whether, “[i]f a State allows a prosecutor 
to introduce a certificate of forensic laboratory analysis without presenting the testimony of 
the analyst who prepared the certificate, . . . the state avoid[s] violating the confrontation 
clause of the Sixth Amendment by providing that the accused has the right to call the analyst 
as his own witness.”  Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert granted 
sub nom., Briscoe v. Virginia, 77 U.S.L.W. 3701 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 07-11191).  The 
Court vacated and remanded Briscoe for “further proceedings not inconsistent with the 
opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.”  Briscoe v. Virginia, 78 U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. 
Jan. 25, 2010), vacating and remanding 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008) (citation omitted).  On 
remand, the Virginia Supreme Court held that its statutory scheme was unconstitutional. 
Cypress v. Commonwealth, Record Nos. 070815, 070817, 2010 WL 3583988, at *7 (Va. 
Sept. 16, 2010).  Most recently, on September 28, 2010 the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, which construes the Confrontation Clause in light of 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).  State v. Bullcoming,  226 P.3d 1 
(N.M. 2010), cert granted sub nom Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 79 U.S.L.W. 3194 (Sep. 28, 
2010).  In Bullcoming, the Court will address “whether the Confrontation Clause permits the 
prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst through 
the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the 
laboratory analysis described in the statements.”  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
Bullcoming, 79 U.S.L.W. 3158 (2010) (09-10876),  2010 WL 3761875, at *i.  
  Police officers who report to a crime scene 
will investigate in order to “both to respond to the emergency situation and 
44 541 U.S. at 68 n.10. 
45 Davis, 547 U.S. at 834. “Today, a mere two years after the Court decided Crawford, it 
adopts an equally unpredictable test, under which district courts are charged with divining 
the ‘primary purpose’ of police interrogations” (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Justice Thomas went on to note, “The Court’s standard is not only 
disconnected from history and unnecessary to prevent abuse; it also yields no predictable 
results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law.”  Id. at 838. 
 Sure enough, to clarify an issue following Davis, the Court granted certiorari and heard 
oral argument on October 5, 2010 in Michigan v. Bryant. 130 S. Ct. 1685 (Mar. 1, 2010) 
(No. 09-150) (mem); Transcript of Oral Argument, Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (No. 09-150).  In 
Bryant, the Court is addressing whether 
preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the perpetrator and circumstances of the 
shooting are nontestimonial because “made under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency,” that emergency including not only aid to a wounded victim, but also the prompt 
identification and apprehension of an apparently violent and dangerous individual.   
Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 2138 (2010) (09-150), 2010 WL 
1776430, at *i.  
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to gather evidence.”46  It will rarely be possible to assign primacy to either 
“of these two ‘largely unverifiable motives.’”47
C. GILES V. CALIFORNIA 
 
Justice Scalia authored a third Confrontation Clause opinion in Giles v. 
California.48  In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court sided with Giles 
in holding that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation 
Clause required proof that a defendant intended to silence the witness.49
In the case underlying the appeal in Giles, Dwayne Giles was 
convicted of first-degree murder for admittedly shooting his ex-girlfriend, 
Brenda Avie.
 
50  Giles unsuccessfully claimed the shooting was justified as 
self-defense.51  At trial, both sides presented evidence of prior violence 
relevant to the self-defense issues.  Defense witnesses described how Avie 
had shot at someone, threatened people with a knife, made verbal threats of 
harm, and vandalized Giles’ home and car.52  Giles testified that on the day 
of the killing, Avie had threatened to kill both him and his new girlfriend.53  
To rebut the defendant’s self-defense claim, the prosecution presented 
evidence of Giles’ physical attack against Avie just weeks before the 
killing.54
An officer testified that weeks before the killing Avie said Giles 
accused her of having an affair, “grabbed her by the shirt, lifted her off the 
floor, and began to choke her . . . .”  When she “broke free and fell to the 
 
 
46 Id. at 839. 
47 Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984)).   
48 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).  On remand, the California Court of Appeals reversed Giles’s 
conviction.  People v. Giles, No. B166937, 2009 WL 457832 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2009). 
49 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority, but there were distinct differences 
among the Justices regarding the reasoning for the result.  Justice Thomas and Justice Alito 
each filed a concurring opinion.  Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693–94.  Justice Souter filed an 
opinion concurring in part in which Justice Ginsburg joined.  Id. at 2694.  Justice Breyer 
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined.  Id. at 2695. 
50 Id. at 2682.  Giles and Avie dated for several years.  People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 
435 (Cal. 2007).  Avie had been shot six times and was not carrying a weapon. Giles, 128 
S.Ct. at 2681.  “One wound was consistent with Avie’s holding her hand up at the time she 
was shot, another was consistent with her having turned to her side, and a third was 




54 Id. at 2681–82; see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the prosecutor introduced Avie’s unconfronted statements to rebut the defendant’s 
affirmative self defense claim and impeach the defendant’s testimony). 
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floor, Giles punched her in the face and head.”55  The officer testified that 
Avie described how “after she broke free again, [Giles] opened a folding 
knife, held it about three feet away from her, and threatened to kill her if he 
found her cheating on him.”56
On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of Avie’s hearsay 
statements describing the alleged previous attack violated his Sixth 
Amendment confrontation rights because the statements were testimonial 
and were not subject to cross-examination.
 
57  The California Court of 
Appeals sided with the State, holding that admission of Avie’s 
unconfronted statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because 
Crawford acknowledged exceptions that were recognized at the time of the 
founding, including the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.58  The 
California Court of Appeals found that Giles had forfeited his right to 
confront Avie by wrongfully intentionally killing her, which made her 
unavailable to testify.59  The California Supreme Court affirmed.60
The United States Supreme Court reversed.  The Giles Court cited 
Crawford as precedential authority for establishing two common law 
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause requirement.
 
61  Using dicta from 
Crawford, the Giles majority solidified the parameters for exceptions to the 
confrontation requirement by restricting them to those “most naturally read 
as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only 
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.”62
The first exception the Giles Court asserted it had previously 
acknowledged was for dying declarations, which the Court described as 
“declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and 
 
 
55 Id. at 2681–82. 
56 Id. 
57 People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).  The United States 
Supreme Court accepted without analysis that Avie’s statements to the police were 
testimonial because the State did not dispute the issue.  Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682.  As a matter 
of evidence law, Avie’s statements were not admitted under a forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception to the hearsay rule.  Instead, California evidence law provided an exception to the 
hearsay exclusionary rule for statements describing the infliction or threat of physical injury 
on an unavailable declarant when the statements are deemed trustworthy.  Id. (citing CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 2008)). 
58 Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 847. 
59 Id. at 850. 
60 People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 435 (Cal. 2007), vacated, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008). 
61 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682.  Crawford did not actually decide these issues.  See 
discussion infra notes 63–66. 
62 Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).  “We have previously 
acknowledged that two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even 
though they were unconfronted.”  Id. at 2682 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6., 62). 
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aware that he was dying.”63  In truth, the Crawford Court explicitly avoided 
determining how it might apply the Confrontation Clause to dying 
declarations by stating, “We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth 
Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations.  
If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”64
Next, the Court outlined a second common law exception, the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, which “permitted the introduction of 
statements of a witness who was ‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or 
procurement’ of the defendant.”
  
In any case, the Court found that Avie’s statements did not fall into this 
exception. 
65  The Court in Crawford did not hold that 
forfeiture by wrongdoing was an exception to the constitutional 
confrontation requirement.  Rather, forfeiture by wrongdoing is mentioned 
once in Crawford, but only as an example of an exception “to the 
Confrontation Clause that make[s] no claim to be a surrogate means of 
assessing reliability,” but instead is based on “essentially equitable 
grounds.”66
Consistent with the originalist interpretation method that Justice Scalia 
applied in Crawford and Davis, his opinion in Giles examined historical 
evidence to decipher the meaning and application of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine at the time of the founding.  His majority opinion 
approaches the historical analysis incrementally.  Using language from 
cases decided in 1666, 1692, and 1851,
 
67 and other sources including 
treatises from 1762, 1791, and 1804,68
 
63 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682. 
 the Court found evidence that courts 
64 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
65 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citations omitted). 
66 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“For example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which 
we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”) (citing Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)). 
67 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing Lord Morley’s Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 
(H.L.1666); Harrison’s Case, (1692) 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H.L.1692) (“made him keep 
away”); Queen v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (K.B.) (“kept away”)). 
68 Id. at 2683 (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 425 
(4th ed. 1762); THOMAS PEAKE, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 62 (2d ed. 1804) 
(“sent” away); 1 GEOFFREY GILBERT, LAW OF EVIDENCE 214 (1791) (“detained and kept back 
from appearing by the means and procurement of the prisoner”)).  The cited publication 
dates of these texts are relevant but not conclusive to prove that they reflect a 
contemporaneous statement of the law.  For example, Gilbert’s treatise was first published in 
1754, but was written earlier.  He died in 1726, and other evidence suggests he wrote the 
treatise in the early 1700s.  George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 
575, 617 n.161 (1997).  The 1762 Hawkins treatise was first published in 1716 and 1721 and 
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had admitted testimonial statements previously made at a coroner’s 
inquest69 and at Marian bail and committal hearings70 if the declarant was 
dead, unable to travel, or unavailable due to the defendant’s wrongful 
procurement of the witness’s absence.71
In the end, Justice Scalia used these few sources to construct a 
forfeiture rule that requires the prosecution to prove the defendant had the 
specific mental state of purposely causing the witness’s absence.  His 
analysis began with the English common law doctrine that allowed 
statements of an unavailable witness to be introduced if the witness was 
“detained” or “kept away” by the “means or procurement” of the 
defendant.
  The step-by-step shifts in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Giles were so gradual, and scan such a vast period of 
history, that they did not appear to change direction. 
72  While admitting that these terms only “suggest” that the 
forfeiture exception applied when the defendant engaged in conduct 
“designed to prevent the witness from testifying,”73
To resolve this ambiguity, Justice Scalia selectively gathered historic 
resources to tip the balance.
 this was the 
interpretation that Justice Scalia selected.  In fact, each of the three 
alternatives: (1) detained, (2) kept away by means of the defendant, or (3) 
kept away by procurement of the defendant, could either be broadly 
construed to include all circumstances where the defendant merely caused 
the witness’s resulting absence, or narrowly construed to only include 
circumstances when the defendant both caused the absence and intended the 
absence.  Either interpretation, without more, is equally reasonable. 
74
 
subsequent editions were published without significant changes. Thomas Y. Davies, 
Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of the Giles Forfeiture Exception Were or 
Were Not “Established at the Time of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 624 
n.94 (2009). 
  However, these resources have limited value 
as authority for determining the meaning of the language quoted to 
69 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at 770–71). 
70 Criminal procedure statutes enacted during the reign of Queen Mary I of England 
required justices of the peace make written records of the sworn statements of witnesses of a 
felony at the time of an arrest.  Those statements were later made available to the felony trial 
court. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? 
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 128–29 (2005) 
(citing the Marian statutes 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c.13 (1554–1555) and 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c.10 
(1555)). 
71 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citations omitted). 
72 Id. (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at 771; Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. 
Tr. at 851 (“made him keep away”); Scaife, 117 Q.B. at 242, 117 Eng. Rep. at 1273 (“kept 
away”)). 
73 Id. 
74 See Davies, supra note 68. 
2010] FORFEITURE OF THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT IN GILES 1509 
articulate the common law rule in the English opinions.  None of the 
reference dictionaries are contemporaneous with the judicial opinions or 
treatise texts.  To investigate the historical meaning of the term “procure,” 
for example, Justice Scalia referred to an edition of Webster’s Dictionary 
published in 1828, over one hundred and sixty years after the Lord Morley 
opinion was written.75  Moreover, it is an American dictionary, rather than 
an English one.  The subsequent reference to the Oxford English Dictionary 
is similarly limited in relevance.  The Giles opinion used only one of 
several definitions of “procure” from the edition published in 1989, more 
than three hundred and twenty years after the Lord Morley opinion.76
Similarly, the term “means” could either be broadly construed to 
include circumstances where the defendant caused the witness’s resulting 
absence, or narrowly to only include a result that the defendant caused and 
intended to achieve.  The Court conceded that either interpretation is 
equally reasonable by stating “while the term ‘means’ could sweep in all 
cases in which a defendant caused a witness to fail to appear, it can also 
connote that a defendant forfeits confrontation rights when he uses an 
intermediary for the purpose of making a witness absent.”
 
77  To support this 
second, narrower interpretation of the 1666 usage of the term “means,” the 
Court cited not only the 1989 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, but 
also the first edition of Webster’s American Dictionary, which was 
published in 1869.78
Justice Scalia’s selective use of particular versions of dictionaries 
seriously undermined the credibility of any commitment to historical 
 
 
75 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining “procure” as “to contrive and effect” and defining 
“procure” as “to get; to gain; to obtain; as by request, loan, effort, labor or purchase”). 
76 Id. (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed.1989) (def.I(3)) (defining 
“procure” as “[t]o contrive or devise with care (an action or proceeding); to endeavour to 
cause or bring about (mostly something evil) to or for a person”)).  For example, the next 
entry defines “procure” as “[t]o bring about by care or pains; also (more vaguely) to bring 
about, cause, effect, produce.”  12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989) 
(def.II(4)).  This definition encompasses a broader scope of conduct, including conduct 
which could simply “bring about, cause, effect, [or] produce” a result.  This range of conduct 
may be less motivated by the actor’s intent.  More strikingly, Justice Scalia did not use 
definition II(6)(b) which is labeled as the entry specifically used in law.  This entry defines 
“procure” as “[t]o induce privately, to suborn, to bribe (a witness, juryman, etc.).”  Id. at def. 
II(6)(b). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (citing 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 516 (2d ed. 1989) (“[A] person who 
intercedes for another or uses influence in order to bring about a desired result”); NOAH 
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 822 (1869) (“That 
through which, or by the help of which, an end is attained”)). 
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authority.79  The dictionaries from 1828, 1868, and 1989 arguably allow for 
either broad or narrow definitions of “procurement” and “means.”80  Yet 
Justice Scalia concluded the history of the terms pointed unequivocally to a 
narrow interpretation of the rule.  This heavy and selective reliance on 
dictionaries is hardly a unique feature to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Giles; 
his use of dictionaries to reach controversial textual interpretations across a 
range of areas of the law is well-chronicled.81
In addition, Justice Scalia determined that cases and treatises 
purportedly contemporaneous with the founding “indicate that a purpose-
based definition” of the terms governed.
 
82  Citing treatises from 1816 and 
1814 and a case from 1819 that use the language “means and contrivance,” 
Justice Scalia gradually added the term “contrivance” into the analysis.83  
Then referring back to the 1869 and 1989 dictionaries, now with the word 
“contrivance” as a guide, Justice Scalia built his case for applying a 
purpose-based interpretation.84
 
79 A couple of decades earlier, Justice Scalia himself recognized the significant problem 
of originalism was accessing and analyzing sufficient relevant and reliable material to 
properly apply it as an interpretive method.  Scalia, supra note 
  To bolster his position, he selected an 1858 
treatise.  This treatise stated that the forfeiture rule applied when a witness 
“had been kept out of the way by the prisoner, or by some one on the 
prisoner’s behalf, in order to prevent him from giving evidence against 
19, at 856–57. 
80 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989) (def.I(3)); 
N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 822 (1869)). 
81 See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 315–30 (1998) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries 
conflicts with the goals of ordinary meaning textualism); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries 
and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (1994) (comparing Justice 
Scalia’s use of dictionaries with the Court’s); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and 
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 363–73 (1994) (documenting 
Justice Scalia’s success in persuading the Court to rely less on legislative history and more 
on dictionaries and arguing that both trends have undermined the Chevron doctrine in 
administrative law).  
82 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683–84. 
83 Id. at 2684 (citing Drayton v. Wells, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott. & McC.) 409, 411 (S.C. 1819) 
(“kept away by the contrivance of the opposite party”); 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE 
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 81 (1816) (“kept away by the means and contrivance of the 
prisoner”); S. M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 165 (1814) (“kept out of 
the way by the means and contrivance of the prisoner”)). 
84 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684, citing 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 47 (1869) (“inventing, devising or planning,”); 3 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 850 (2d ed. 1989) (“ingeniously endeavoring the accomplishment of anything,” 
“the bringing to pass by planning, scheming, or stratagem,” or “[a]daption of means to an 
end; design, intention”). 
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him.”85
Finally, the Court examined the “manner in which the rule was 
applied” and decided that this evidence “makes plain” that unconfronted 
testimony would not have been admitted without a showing that “the 
defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”
  Without evidence to the contrary, the Court reasoned that this is the 
correct interpretation. 
86  For support, the 
Court cited several cases where a victim’s statements were excluded 
because the dying declaration foundation was insufficient, or because the 
procedures for statements taken according to the Marian bail statutes were 
improperly followed.  In each of these situations, the Court asserted that the 
prosecution failed to argue that forfeiture by wrongdoing was an alternative 
exception.87  From this information, the Court deduced that the prosecution 
did not make the argument because the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
required a showing that “the defendant intended to prevent a witness from 
testifying,” which was clearly not present.88
The Court examined two English spousal homicide cases to reach this 
conclusion.  First, a 1789 case in which the judge said dying declarations 
and depositions taken according to the Marian bail and committal statutes 
were admissible, but other out of court statements were not because “the 
prisoner [] had no opportunity of contradicting the facts [they] contain[].”
 
89  
Two years later, a court excluded a homicide victim’s sworn deposition 
because the defendant had not been present and thus did not “have, as he is 
entitled to have, the benefit of cross-examination.”90  In both of these cases, 
the Court noted that the prosecution did not use forfeiture as a second line 
of argument for admission.  In addition, the majority asserted that until 
1985, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in American courts required 
“deliberate witness tampering.”91
In sum, the majority demonstrated that there were two established 
exceptions to the confrontation requirement—statements taken according to 
proper Marian depositions and dying declarations.  The majority also cited 
 
 
85 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684 (citing EDMUND POWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 166 (1st ed. 1858)). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 2685–86 (citations omitted). 
88 Id. at 2684. 
89 Id. at 2684–85 (citing King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 
(1789)). 
90 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2685 (citing King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562, 168 Eng. Rep. 
383, 384 (1791)). 
91 Id. at 2687 (referencing United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985)) 
(holding that a defendant who killed a peace offer while resisting arrest “waived his right to 
cross-examine [the peace officer] by killing him”). 
1512 ELLEN LIANG YEE [Vol. 100 
authority to establish that there was a third exception to the confrontation 
requirement—forfeiture by wrongdoing.  To establish the limited scope of 
the forfeiture doctrine, the majority attempted to show that forfeiture was 
not argued as an alternative in cases where the two established 
confrontation exceptions were at issue.  Selectively using the language and 
facts of these cases, the majority asserted that forfeiture was not raised 
because the historical forfeiture doctrine required proof of the defendant’s 
purpose to prevent a witness from testifying.  Surmising that such a purpose 
was not provable in these cases, the Giles Court concluded this is the reason 
the prosecution did not even attempt to pursue this route.  While not a 
wholly unreasonable inference, the dissent later demonstrated that this was 
not a logical, singular conclusion based on the available information.92
Finally, the Court proceeded to turn its own logic on its head by using 
evidence law and the “modern view” of interpretation of evidence law to 
support its historical interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.
 
93  After 
vigorously asserting that the historical scope of the constitutional doctrine 
was determinative, the Giles Court confoundingly used these modern 
evidence references as authority.94 Quoting the Federal Rule of Evidence 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, which was adopted 
in 1997, the Court claimed that the rule “codifies the forfeiture doctrine.”95
As the third major Confrontation Clause case, Giles revealed a highly 
fractured Court.  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia used historical 
research to interpret the meaning of the forfeiture doctrine at the time of the 
founding.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito signed on to all aspects of 
Scalia’s opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts was the only Justice who did not 
write separately.  Justices Thomas and Alito each wrote separately to 
discuss whether the declarant’s statements were testimonial despite the 
clear exclusion of this issue by both parties.  While Justice Thomas 
concurred in the result and, indirectly, in the rationale, he did so only 
 
 
92 Id. at 2704–05 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “But the majority’s house of cards has no 
foundation; it is built on what is at most common-law silence on the subject.”  Id. at 2705 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 2687–88. 
94 Id. at 2687 (citing 85 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 8:134 (3d ed. 2007); 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.03[7][b] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); 2 
KENNETH S. BROWN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 176 (6th ed. 2006)).  The commentators 
come out this way because the dissent’s claim that knowledge is sufficient to show intent is 
emphatically not the modern view. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 5.2 (2d ed. 2003) (footnote omitted). 
95 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 833).  Evidence codes in twelve 
states contain a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception.  Id. at 2688 n.2. 
2010] FORFEITURE OF THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT IN GILES 1513 
because the “opinion accurately reflects [the Court’s] Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence where the applicability of that Clause is not at issue.”96  
Under Justice Thomas’ framework, the statement itself was not even 
testimonial.  Consistent with his position in Crawford and Davis, he 
restated that only formalized statements should be testimonial, and Avie’s 
statements here were not.97  Justice Alito similarly questioned whether 
Avie’s statements were testimonial under these circumstances, but given 
that the issue was not raised, agreed with the Court’s forfeiture doctrine 
analysis.98
Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in part, but grounded their 
support for the limit on the forfeiture exception based on the rationale rather 
than solely on the historical record.  Describing the Court’s historical 
analysis as “sound” and both the Court’s and the dissent’s examination of 
the historical record as “careful,”
 
99 Justices Souter and Ginsburg concluded 
that history alone was not dispositive “when the crime charged occurred in 
an abusive relationship or was its culminating act . . . .”100
Their concurrence supported the interpretation that the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception requires an additional judicial determination by a 
preponderance of the evidence of defendant’s intent to prevent the witness 
from testifying.
 
101  Justice Souter argued that two aspects of the historical 
background supported the majority’s position. In his view, the historical 
sources substantially indicated that the Sixth Amendment was “meant to 
require some degree of intent to thwart the judicial process before thinking 
it reasonable to hold the confrontation right forfeited . . . .”102  Further, these 
sources indicated that “the element of intention would normally be satisfied 
by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic 
abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, 
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process.”103
 
96 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 
97 Id. at 2693. 
98 Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).  This position is seemingly inconsistent with his 
former position in Davis where he joined the majority opinion which held in the Hammon 
case that a similarly situated victim statement to a responding police officer was testimonial.  
Davis, 547 U.S. at 815. 
99 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
100 Id. at 2694–95. 
101 Id. at 2694.  “Equity demands something more than this near circularity before the 
right to confrontation is forfeited, and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the 
witness from testifying.  Cf. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.”  Id. (citation modified). 
102 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695. 
103 Id. at 2695. 
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Justices Ginsburg and Souter did not join the section of the opinion 
that characterized the dissent as “a thinly veiled invitation to overrule 
Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the regime of 
Ohio v. Roberts under which the Court would create the exceptions that it 
thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee, 
regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood.”104  In this 
section, Justice Scalia rejected the dissent’s approach of “reason[ing] from 
the ‘basic purposes and objectives’ of the forfeiture doctrine.”105  This 
section further criticized the dissent for diminishing a defendant’s right to 
confrontation because the defendant’s ability to exercise the right would be 
determined according to a trial court’s concept of what is “fair.”106
Justice Breyer wrote a sharp dissent that was joined by Justices 
Stevens and Kennedy.  However, the dissent started with one important 
point of agreement.  Justice Breyer agreed that the historical sources “make 
clear that ‘forfeiture by wrongdoing’ satisfies Crawford’s requirement that 
the Confrontation Clause be ‘read as a reference to the right of 
confrontation at common law’ and that ‘any exception’ must be ‘established 
at the time of the founding.’”
 
107  Reviewing the same historical sources as 
the majority, Justice Breyer determined that the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception was in fact established at the time of the founding.108
The crucial difference between the majority and the dissent lies in 
outlining the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the 
Confrontation Clause.
 
109  Justice Breyer enumerated three reasons why 
Avie’s statements should fall within the scope of the exception to the 
Confrontation Clause: (1) the common law history, (2) the principles of 
criminal law and evidence, and (3) the pragmatic need for a rule that can be 
fairly applied by courts.110
 
104 Id. at 2692. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg concurred with the Giles 
opinion, but did not join Part II.D.2.  Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694. 
  The dissent effectively dismantled the 
majority’s logic and reasoning, but offered a somewhat unsatisfying 
approach to the problem.  Concluding that the history was too sparse or 
unclear to determine what the scope of the forfeiture doctrine was at the 
105 Id. at 2691. 
106 Id. at 2692.  Justice Scalia warned that if the forfeiture doctrine is not narrowly 
construed, it would risk depriving a defendant of a fair jury trial because the court’s pretrial 
ruling on admissibility of the testimonial statement is based on a judicial determination of 
the defendant’s wrongdoing.  Id. 
107 Id. at 2696 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 
(2004)). 
108 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2696. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 2695–2709. 
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time of the founding, the dissent simply attempted to demonstrate why a 
broad forfeiture doctrine would be reasonable and desirable in the present. 
III. FORFEITURE AND ITS HISTORY 
Many legal historians have researched the origins of the Confrontation 
Clause.111  Early evidence of the conceptual foundation of the confrontation 
right has been recognized as far back as the Roman era.112  Scholars have 
noted that early English jurisprudence arguably recognized a form of the 
right of confrontation even before the right to a jury trial.113
Early American historical documents only rarely mention the right of 
confrontation.
 
114  The historical record reflects that the American right of 
confrontation was recognized first at the state level.  Several states had 
adopted declarations of rights that guaranteed a right of confrontation 
before the Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791.115
 
111 See, e.g., William H. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due 
Process—A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 
CONN. L. REV. 529, 532 (1974); Davies, supra note 
  In addition, the 
Supreme Court has often recognized that a common law right of 
68; Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. 
Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 
34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 483–84 (1994); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the 
Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995); Robert Kry, 
Forfeiture and Cross-Examination, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577 (2009); Murl A. Larkin, 
The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67 (1969); Peter Tillers, 
Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of History in Judicial Interpretation of 
the Confrontation Clause (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for 
Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 110, 2005). 
112 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015–16 (1988) (quoting Acts 25:16). 
113 Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. 
L. 381, 384–87 (1959) (cited in Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016). 
114 Jonakait, supra note 111, at 77 n.4 (“Congressional intent is virtually impossible to 
determine since ‘[t]he clause was debated for a mere five minutes before its adoption.’”) 
(quoting Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 
S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 332 n.181 (1981)). 
115 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 48 (2004) (citing Virginia Declaration of 
Rights § 8 (1776); Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § IX (1776); Delaware Declaration of 
Rights § 14 (1776); Maryland Declaration of Rights § XIX (1776); North Carolina 
Declaration of Rights § VII (1776); Vermont Declaration of Rights Ch. I, § X (1777); 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XII (1780); New Hampshire Bill of Rights § XV 
(1783), all reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
235, 265, 278, 282, 287, 323, 342, 377 (1971)).  In addition, scholars have questioned the 
Court’s focus on 1791 as the relevant date given that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to 
the states until it was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  See, e.g., 
Lininger, supra note 15, at 877; Nicolas, supra note 34, at 504–06; Myrna Raeder, 
Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and 
Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2005). 
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confrontation preceded the adoption of the Sixth Amendment.116  Beyond 
this, scholars have found little documentation of the Framers’ intended 
meaning and application of the Clause.117
Furthermore, in the years following the ratification of the federal 
Confrontation Clause, the Court was infrequently petitioned to interpret and 
apply the right.  The first major case arose in 1895, more than a hundred 
years after ratification.  In Mattox v. United States, the Court held that the 
confrontation right is not absolute.
 
118  The Court explained that the right 
“must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case.”119
Beginning with Crawford,
 
120 Justice Scalia has taken hold of the reins 
of Confrontation Clause interpretation and led the Court steadily in a new 
direction.  Rather than using or building on the existing doctrine developed 
in Ohio v. Roberts and its progeny,121 Justice Scalia has advanced an 
interpretation based on the history and origins of the Clause and used this 
“original” meaning to interpret the Clause’s application to the present day 
facts.  Using the “right of confrontation at common law” to guide his 
interpretive analysis,122
While in theory this is a reasonable approach, in practice it is much 
more difficult and complicated to implement.
 Justice Scalia has attempted to ground the Court’s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in historical authority.   
123  Certainly one logical 
method to determine the meaning of a text is to interpret it according to 
what the text meant at the time it was written.  However, when there is little 
relevant data available to analyze, the resulting determination is less 
reliable.  Scholars have critiqued the Court’s historical research and 
analysis in Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause trilogy: Crawford,124 
Davis,125 and Giles.126
 
116 Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926).  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. 
 
117 See Davies, supra note 70, at 120–206. 
118 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250 (1895) (finding no Confrontation Clause 
violation to admit the reporter’s stenographic notes of two deceased witnesses’ cross-
examined prior testimony at defendant’s retrial for murder). 
119 Id. at 243. 
120 Evidence of Justice Scalia’s viewpoint can be found earlier in his concurrence with 
Justice Thomas in 1992, where he suggested that the Court’s Confrontation jurisprudence 
“has evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause 
itself.”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
121 See supra Part II. 
122 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
123 Davies, supra note 70, at 105–07. 
124 The Brooklyn Law Review published several articles in its seventy-first volume from a 
symposium held in 2005 entitled “Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the 
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Justice Scalia’s approach to the forfeiture doctrine—the notion that 
defendants may forfeit the protections of the Confrontation Clause to the 
extent they intend to render a witness unavailable to testify at trial—
illustrates the limits of his constitutional methodology and its unintended 
consequences for criminal procedure. 
A. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CURIOUS DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMON LAW 
OF FORFEITURE 
Justice Scalia’s historical analysis led him to the firm conclusion that 
the evidence points to only one interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine: that 
the State must prove the defendant’s purposive intent to keep the declarant 
from testifying at trial.127
Both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent 
mine the history of the forfeiture doctrine in the context of the 
Confrontation Clause for nuggets of evidence to analyze the scope and 
applicability of the doctrine.  The same historical record, however, leads 
Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer to reach differing conclusions.  As Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg observe in their concurrence, “early cases on the 
exception were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question 
here.”
  Beneath this conclusion, however, is a deep 
analytical flaw.  Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine is 
simply not clearly supported by the historical sources, as the only critical 
cases he references are silent rather than determinative on the issue of 
forfeiture.  Furthermore, the evidence he presents to support his 
interpretation of the common law forfeiture doctrine is incomplete and 
overbroad, and as a result his analysis of the doctrine is arbitrarily selective. 
128
 
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past—Can History Define the Structure of the 
Confrontation Clause?”  See e.g., Davies, supra note 
  Justice Breyer also recognized the indeterminacy of the historical 
70; Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-
Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005); 
Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide A Stable Foundation For Confrontation Doctrine? 
71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 77–83 (2005).  
125 Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against 
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford–Davis Testimonial Formulation of the Scope of the 
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352–53 (2007); see also Randolph N. 
Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier's 
Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 471, 474–77 (2007) 
(analyzing the Court’s incorrect use of Brasier in Crawford and Davis to discuss the 
common law right of confrontation). 
126 Davies, supra note 68, at 624 n.94. 
127 See supra Part II.C. 
128 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
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record, noting “the possibility that there are too few old records available 
for us to draw firm conclusions.”129
The legal historian John Langbein has previously cautioned, 
“continuing confusion about the very nature of the law of evidence at the 
end of the eighteenth century underscores how primitive and undertheorized 
the subject then was.”
 
130  If the historical meaning of common law doctrine 
were determinative, an accurate interpretation would not only require 
dictionary definitions—as Justice Scalia draws on—but would require an 
assessment of the rules and the context of their application in the legal 
system.  For example, many of the leading cases involving forfeiture 
doctrine are, in modern terms, “domestic violence” cases.  This type of 
conduct was regarded substantially differently by the justice system at the 
time of the founding.  As Justice Breyer recognizes, “200 years ago, it 
might have been seen as futile for women to hale their abusers before a 
Marian magistrate where they would make such a statement.”131  Conduct 
that is now criminally punishable may not have been criminal at the time, 
and thus not even “wrongdoing” in some other sense.132
Even Justice Scalia seemed to acknowledge in his majority opinion 
that acts of domestic violence may “dissuade a victim from resorting to 
outside help,” including “prevent[ing] testimony to police officers or 
cooperation in criminal prosecutions.”
 
133  Justice Scalia, however, narrows 
forfeiture to only acts “intended to dissuade,” or acts that have the purpose 
of thwarting criminal investigations and testimony.134
 
129 Id. at 2704 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
  In Giles, Justice 
Scalia asserts unequivocally that “[c]ases and treatises of the time indicate 
that a purpose-based definition of the terms ‘kept back,’  ‘detained,’ by 
130 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 248 (2003); see 
also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2704 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
131 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2703–04; see, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (Phil. Law), 459 
(1868) (per curiam) (“We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain 
upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.”). 
132 See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital 
Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (discussing the history of the common law marital rape 
exemption).  Some physical violence towards wives was also not punishable.  “[T]he old 
writers say that a husband may chastise his wife with a rod no thicker than this thumb . . . .”  
Id. at 1389 n.43 (citing 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 815 (John 
Houston Merrill ed., 1888)); see also Raeder, supra note 115, at 312 n.6 (2005) (citing 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 (1765)).  But see e.g, 
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880–1920, 77 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 101 (2006) (showing that men who killed their intimate partners were often 
more severely punished than women who did the same). 
133 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693. 
134 Id. 
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‘means or procurement’ governed.”135
B. PLACING THE HISTORY OF FORFEITURE DOCTRINE IN CONTEXT 
 However, a more careful and 
complete examination of the law around 1791 reveals that the meaning of 
these terms was much less clear and was not as narrow as he suggests. 
As Justice Breyer states in his Giles dissent: “I know of no instance in 
which this Court has drawn a conclusion about the meaning of a common-
law rule solely from the absence of cases showing the contrary—at least not 
where there are other plausible explanations for that absence.  And there are 
such explanations here.”136  The limited historical record examined by both 
the majority and dissent is insufficient to concretely define the contours of 
the doctrine.  But ultimately, Justice Breyer is correct on the essential point: 
“[T]he majority’s house of cards has no foundation; it is built on what is at 
most common-law silence on the subject.”137
Important English cases on the law of forfeiture were decided in the 
period spanning 1666 to 1851, but do not lend clear support to Justice 
Scalia’s narrow definition of forfeiture.  For example, Lord Morley’s Case, 
decided in 1666, held that a prior testimonial statement would be admissible 
if the witness was “dead or unable to travel” or “detained by the means or 
procurement of the prisoner.”
 
138  While the court did not admit the absent 
witness’s statement, the court did not do so based on an inquiry into the 
defendant’s intent regarding the absence.  The court simply found there was 
an insufficient connection between the defendant and the witness’s absence 
based on evidence that the witness had run away and told others that he 
would not attend the trial.139
In Harrison’s Case, the court did not require proof of the defendant’s 
purpose to prevent the witnesses from testifying.  The court admitted the 
absent witness’s former statement even when it was not firmly proven that 
the defendant himself was responsible for the witness’s absence.  The court 
attributed the witness’s absence to two occurrences, that “a gentleman” had 
come to offer the witness money “to be kind to Mr. Harrison” and that the 
witness “was inticed [sic] away by three soldiers” and had not since 
 
 
135 Id. at 2683–84. 
136 Id. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
137 Id. at 2705. 
138 Lord Morley’s Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770 (H. L.) (discussing coroner’s 
out-of-court “examinations” of witnesses). 
139 Id. at 777. 
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returned.140  On this evidence, the court found sufficient evidence to show 
that the defendant used “ill practice to take [the witness] out of the way.”141
Similarly in Lord Fenwick’s Case, the court admitted an absent 
witness’s prior statement because the defendant or others had “by 
fraudulent and indirect means, procured a [prior witness] to withdraw 
himself . . . .”
   
142  However, again, because the court could not determine 
whether the defendant was directly responsible for the witness’s absence, 
the court did not require proof of the defendant’s specific intent to cause the 
absence.143
By contrast, in Queen v. Scaife, the court did not admit an absent 
witness’s prior statement without a minimum connection between the 
defendant and the person who “resorted to a contrivance to keep the witness 
out of the way . . . .”
 
144  Because evidence showed that only the third co-
defendant was connected to the witness’s absence, the court did not enquire 
into the defendant’s specific intent.145
As Justice Breyer emphasized in his dissent, other cases used by the 
majority, such as Woodcock and Dingler are not relevant to assessing the 
requisite mental state of the defendant for forfeiture, as they were analyzed 
as improper Marian depositions or dying declarations.
 
146  Since mental state 
was not the touchstone of the application of forfeiture to these cases, it is a 
serious stretch to read them, as does Justice Scalia, as requiring a purposive 
mental state on the part of the defendant to make the witness unavailable as 
a predicate to forfeiture.147
Early American cases similarly do not clearly support Justice Scalia’s 
interpretation of the common law as recognizing only a narrow forfeiture 
doctrine.  Three American cases decided between 1819 and 1879 held that 
prior testimonial statements would be admissible if the witness “had been 
kept away by the contrivance of the opposite party,”
 
148 “was detained by 
means or procurement of the prisoner,”149
 
140 Harrison’s Case, (1692) 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851–52 (H. L.). 
 or “is absent by [the 
141 Id. 
142 Lord Fenwick’s Case, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 594 (H.C.). 
143 Id.  “[N]o such thing [that Fenwick had tampered with the witness] hath been 
proved . . . .”  Id. at 606. 
144 Queen v. Scaife, (1851) 17 Ad. E. 238, 242, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (Q.B.). 
145 Id. 
146 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2703 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
147 See King v. Dingler, (1791) 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383; King v. Woodcock, 
(1789) 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352. 
148 Drayton v. Wells, 10 S.C.L. 409, 411 (1819). 
149 Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 403 (1856). 
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defendant’s] . . . own wrongful procurement.”150  In a fourth American case, 
the court admitted a witness’s prior statement where the witness had 
testified before a justice and grand jury and was “sent away” by a friend of 
the defendant “so that he could not be had to testify before the petit jury.”151
The Giles majority asserted that the forfeiture doctrine applied only in 
cases of deliberate witness tampering from the “time of the founding” until 
1985.
  
None of these cases explicitly required a purpose-based mental state. 
152  However, the first Supreme Court case to address forfeiture was 
not until 1879, in Reynolds v. United States.153  Reynolds itself relied on 
leading English common law cases—Lord Morley’s Case, Harrison’s Case, 
and Scaife.154  However, given that the statement at issue in Reynolds was 
former trial testimony that had been confronted, Reynolds’ analysis of the 
statement was primarily a discussion of evidence law, not constitutional 
law.155
Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the defendant’s conduct in 
Reynolds.  There is no direct evidence of “purposeful” wrongful conduct to 
 
 
150 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
151 Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct.1775).  Two leading evidentiary treatises 
and a Delaware case reporter cite that case for the proposition that grand jury statements 
were admitted on a wrongful-procurement theory.  Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2689 (citing 
PHILLIPPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, at 200, n.(a); THOMAS PEAKE, COMPENDIUM 
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 91, n.(m) (American ed. 1824); State v. Lewis, 1 Del. Cas. 608, 
609 n.1 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1818)). 
 However, it is unclear whether the admitted statement was previously confronted or not.  
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2689–90, see also 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  While generally grand 
jury proceedings were secret and thus the statements made were unconfronted by the 
defendant, there is some evidence to suggest that the statements in Barber were confronted.  
Id. (citing SARA SUN BEALE, ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.2 (2d ed. 2005)); 
see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2360, pp. 728–35 
(John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961)); see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2690 n. 4. (“Three 
commentators writing more than a century after the Barber decision, said, without 
explanation, that they understood the case to have admitted only confronted testimony at a 
preliminary examination.”); W. M. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 473, 
n.(e) (American ed. 1883); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
161 (1902); 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1197, at 1024 (2d ed. 
1913) (“We know of no basis for that understanding. The report of the case does not limit the 
admitted testimony to statements that were confronted.”). 
152 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687.  In other circumstances, the Supreme Court has held a 
defendant “forfeits” his Sixth Amendment confrontation right to be present at trial by 
engaging in noncriminal disruptive conduct.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342–
43 (1970). 
153 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
154 Id. at 158. 
155 Id. at 161 (citing 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 
§ 177, at 160–62). 
1522 ELLEN LIANG YEE [Vol. 100 
keep the witness away.  Rather, there is evidence from which one could 
reasonably infer that the defendant kept the witness away from the trial.  
The facts indicate that when an officer went to the defendant’s home to 
serve a subpoena on the witness who also resided there, the defendant said 
the witness was not home and did not reveal the witness’s location to the 
officer.156  When the defendant was told that the witness would get into 
trouble for making it difficult to subpoena her, the defendant replied that the 
witness would not be in trouble until the subpoena was served.157  Upon 
these facts, the court decided to admit the witness’s former testimony in the 
trial.  At most, the defendant did not help the government serve the 
subpoena.  But such an omission, without an affirmative duty to assist the 
officer, is not sufficient evidence to find the defendant purposely kept the 
witness away.  One could only speculate that the defendant had done 
something to purposefully prevent the witness from being subpoenaed.  But 
as analysis of the defendant’s “intent,” the Reynolds Court only uses the 
term “voluntarily” to describe the defendant’s mental state in “keep[ing] the 
witnesses away.”158
Justice Scalia concludes that the fact that the older common law cases 
did not address forfeiture must mean that forfeiture required proof that the 
defendant acted with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying, 
and such proof was not present.
 
159  However, there are other inferences that 
can be drawn from the lack of attention to forfeiture in these cases.  To 
begin, it may have been that the law was sufficiently undeveloped at the 
time that the attorneys did not consider forfeiture as an alternative; this may 
have been a particular barrier given that courts did not widely begin to 
acknowledge many domestic violence crimes until relatively late in the 
nineteenth century.160
 
156 Id. at 159–60. 
  Especially if the law was inchoate in its protections 
of victims, the attorneys may have made tactical decisions not to go forward 
on a forfeiture theory. 
157 Id. at 160. 
158 Id.at 158. 
159 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2684–86 (2008) (discussing King v. Woodcock, 
(1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B.); King v. Dingler, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B.)). 
160 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as a Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118, 2124 (1996).  Prior to reforms in the nineteenth century, laws in 
England and the United States gave husbands the right to “chastise,” or corporally punish, 
their wives.  Id. 
2010] FORFEITURE OF THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT IN GILES 1523 
In addition, it is an equally reasonable inference that there was no 
well-established hearsay exception for forfeiture at the time.161  In fact, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence did not adopt a forfeiture hearsay exception until 
1997.162  Importantly, at the time of the framing, there was little or no 
distinction between confrontation law and hearsay law in common law.  
Thus, if dying declaration requirements are met, the statement was 
admissible for evidentiary hearsay and constitutional confrontation 
purposes.  As it is now understood, the right to “confront” a witness is 
actually a bundle of rights, including the right to be present and observe the 
witness’s demeanor, the right to cross-examine, and the right that witnesses 
testify under oath.163  Finally, cases discussed in Giles, including Woodcock 
and Dingler,164
One early American case demonstrates a court’s explicit separation of 
evidence law issues from constitutional confrontation issues.  In McDaniel 
v. State,
 are distinguishable in that the statements are only directly 
related to the killing at issue, whereas in Giles, the statements are relevant 
to prior potentially criminally punishable conduct, prior assault, and threats. 
165
 
161 It was Justice Scalia who in Crawford asserted that “we do not think the Framers 
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence.”  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 the court held the declarant’s prior statement admissible as a 
162 Evidence law was primarily common law and only partly statutory before the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were enacted.  See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the 
Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 909 (1978). 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975.  For a discussion of  this 
history of the development of the Rules, see Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The 
Failure to See The Federal Rules of Evidence as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1567–76 (1999). 
 The proposed forfeiture rule was approved by the Supreme Court on April 11, 1997, and 
became effective on December 1, 1997, as FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).  Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 694, 708 (1997).  There is one major distinction 
between the evidentiary forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and the constitutional 
confrontation doctrine.  Any and all parties may invoke the evidentiary hearsay exception—
not only criminal prosecutors, but also criminal defendants, civil plaintiffs, and civil 
defendants.  By contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation resides solely with a 
criminal defendant.  Thus, while it is possible for the evidentiary rule to codify precisely 
how the rule must apply when used against a criminal defendant, it is just as likely that the 
rule reflects considerations regarding common law application of the forfeiture doctrine in 
all contexts.  The Advisory Committee supports this by noting that the wrongdoing not need 
to be a criminal act to be sufficiently “wrong” and that forfeiture applied to all parties, even 
the government.  Id. 
163 See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J, dissenting); 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). 
164 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684–86 (discussing King v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 
352 (K.B.); King v. Dingler, (1971) 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B.)). 
165 McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401 (Miss. Err. & App. 1847). 
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dying declaration.  The defendant’s subsequent objection that admission of 
the statement would nonetheless violate his confrontation right was 
rejected.  The court expressly held that the defendant’s confrontation rights 
were not violated based on the forfeiture by wrongdoing principle.166
The Giles majority smoothly transitions from a discussion of the 
common law’s narrow definition of forfeiture to the 1997 adoption in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  This seems a necessary and logical source of 
information to examine.  However, the Court’s legerdemain brings us back 
to the very intertwining of evidentiary hearsay law and constitutional 
confrontation analysis that it so boldly denounced in Crawford v. 
Washington.
 
167  The Court uses its own opinion in Davis as a reference for 
the proposition that the 1997 Federal Rules of Evidence forfeiture hearsay 
exception in fact, codifies the forfeiture doctrine.168
The entire Court, including those joining Justice Breyer’s dissent, 
acknowledged that in both Crawford and Davis, the Court had “recognized” 
the exception of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
  Oddly—and some 
might say hypocritically—the Court is now using present day evidence law 
to support an interpretation of the meaning of the constitutional 
Confrontation Clause doctrine at the time of either the founding or the 
adoption of the Sixth Amendment. 
169  Indeed, a 1791 evidence law 
treatise noted that prior testimonial statements would be admitted if a 
witness is “kept back from appearing by the means and procurement of the 
prisoner.”170
 
166 Id. at *8; see also Woodsides v. State, 2 Howard 655 (Miss. Err. App 1837).  Recent 
cases demonstrate how courts have continued to find no Confrontation Clause violation 
when unconfronted statements were admitted under a forfeiture theory without evidence that 
the defendant acted with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d. 
1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 914 (1977). 
  But a majority of the members of the Court did not agree with 
Justice Scalia in Giles that this entails proof of a high level mental state, 
such as purpose, as a predicate to forfeiture.  Justices Souter and Ginsburg’s 
concurrence concludes that the historical sources provide “substantial 
indication” that the Confrontation Clause required “some degree of intent to 
thwart the judicial process” before its protection would reasonably be 
167 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . .”). 
168 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680. 
169 Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; Davis, 547 U.S. 
at 833). 
170 1 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 214–15 (1791); see also Fisher, supra 
note 68. 
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forfeited.171  However, they seem to soften the impact of the majority’s 
strict specific intent requirement by commenting that the “absence from the 
early material of any reason to doubt that the element of intention would 
normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic 
abuser in the classic abusive relationship” who means to isolate the victim 
and prevent the victim’s ability to reach out for help.172
IV. THE DIFFICULTY WITH “PURPOSE” IN THE MODERN FORFEITURE 
INQUIRY 
  Equity would 
require, and the historical record would support, such a finding and a far 
more flexible approach to forfeiture than Justice Scalia advances in his 
majority opinion. 
In effect, the Giles majority holds that the prosecution must show that 
a defendant had the “purpose” to prevent the witness from testifying in 
order to assert forfeiture.  At best, however, an examination of the history 
of the common law is inconclusive regarding whether, and how, the 
defendant’s purpose, or even arguably any mental state, matters to 
forfeiture.  Moreover, current understandings of “intent” in both criminal 
law and evidence law would suggest that linking purpose to forfeiture leads 
courts down a troubling path, especially if they construe intent in the 
excessively narrow manner Justice Scalia suggests in Giles.  Instead of 
following only Justice Scalia’s restricted approach, lower courts should take 
into account the proper common law understanding of intent in the 
forfeiture context, as well as equity, especially as they apply the 
Confrontation Clause. 
A. WHY REQUIRE ANY MENTAL STATE FOR FORFEITURE? 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Giles argues that one reasonable 
interpretation of the cases suggests that mere causation may be sufficient 
for forfeiture.  That is, if the defendant’s wrongful act caused the witness’s 
absence, then the defendant has forfeited the right to confront that witness’s 
prior testimonial statements.173  Using the language from Lord Morley’s 
Case allowing forfeiture when the witness was absent or detained “by 
means or procurement of the prisoner,”174
 
171 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
 Justice Breyer argues that “[t]he 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 2701 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
174 Id. (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr., at 771). 
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phrase ‘by means of’ focuses on what the defendant did, not his motive for 
(or purpose in) doing it.”175
As the Giles dissent highlights, it is not at all clear why forfeiture 
should be linked to any mental state.  On several occasions within his 
dissent, Justice Breyer focuses on the “causation” component of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing requirements.  If the defendant could be shown to 
have caused the witness’s unavailability to testify at trial, the causal link 
may be sufficient to require him to forfeit his opportunity to confront.  
Interestingly, however, Justice Breyer never extends his argument to its 
logical conclusion: strict liability in the sense of automatic forfeiture where 
a defendant’s conduct or activities makes a witness unavailable. 
 
The primary objection to mere causation as a standard for forfeiture 
stems from the same principle as the exception itself: it would not be 
equitable to admit the evidence in some circumstances.  If the only 
requirement were that the defendant caused the witness’s unavailability, 
then all of a homicide victim’s statements would be admissible, subject 
only to the jurisdiction’s hearsay rules.  In other cases, where the 
wrongdoing consists of threats or bribes, this broad causation rule may not 
provide the prosecution sufficient incentive to try to get the witness to 
court.  Or, for example, if the defendant were involved in a car accident that 
caused the witness’s unavailability, it would not promote equitable 
principles to use the unfortunate, but not culpable situation against the 
defendant. 
Indeed, early English criminal law based liability on essentially strict 
liability, with no explicit requirement of a mental state.176  If the state could 
establish cause in fact, also known as “but for” causation, it was sufficient 
to impose liability.  But as the common law developed, it began to 
incorporate concepts regarding moral wrongdoing and blameworthiness.177
 
175 Id.  “In Diaz v. United States, which followed Reynolds, this Court used the word ‘by’ 
(the witness was absent “by the wrongful act of” the accused), a word that suggests 
causation, not motive or purpose . . . .  And in Motes v. United States, the Court spoke of 
absence ‘with the assent of’ the defendant, a phrase perfectly consistent with an absence that 
is a consequence of, not the purpose of, what the assenting defendant hoped to accomplish.”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
  
Criminal law today continues to develop ways of conceptualizing and 
implementing the connection between moral blameworthiness, culpability, 
and punishment.  It is not surprising, therefore, to see a link between 
176 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977–80 (1932) (tracing 
the historical development of mental state requirements in criminal law). 
177 See id. at 988–94 (1932) (discussing the influence of Roman and canon law on the 
common law of crimes). 
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forfeiture and a mental state requirement.  What is curious is to attribute the 
connection retroactively to the common law, as does Justice Scalia. 
Despite this argument, however, the difference of opinion between the 
majority and dissent was not whether intent is required.  Justice Breyer 
ultimately seemed to concede that some level of intent is required.178  The 
dissent, however, rejected the majority’s interpretation of “procurement” to 
require proof of defendant’s “purpose” or “motive” as unpersuasive.179  
Citing nineteenth century dictionaries and a treatise, the dissent was not 
convinced by the majority’s interpretation of the terms “procurement” or 
“contrivance.”180  Both terms could be interpreted either to include only 
purposeful conduct, or more generally any conduct which causes a result.181  
The dissent emphasized that the only source which supported the majority’s 
position was an evidence treatise which was written almost seventy years 
after the founding.182  Unlike other treatises cited in the opinion that, at 
minimum, existed before the founding, the Powell treatise was first 
published in 1858.183
B. PARSING THE REQUISITE INTENT FOR FORFEITURE 
 
Even if it were to be conceded that intent was, in some manner, the 
touchstone of the common law of forfeiture, mental states in modern 
criminal law are simply far more complicated than Justice Scalia suggests 
in Giles.  Modern courts continue to struggle with mental state issues, both 
in analyzing an intangible concept, as well as in using language to express 
that analysis.  Commonly used lay words, such as “intent” or “knowing,” 
become terms in legal analysis with very particular meanings.  To add even 
more complexity, courts, and now legislatures, continue to use these terms 
inconsistently. 
Proof of mental state is commonly established through inferences 
drawn from circumstantial evidence.184
 
178 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would apply a simple intent 
requirement across the board.”). 
  To reinforce this notion, courts 
179 Id. at 2701. 
180 See supra notes 74–85 and accompanying text. 
181 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2700–01 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
182 Id. at 2701–02; see also POWELL, supra note 85, at 166. 
183 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
184 See Woodsides v. State, 2 Howard 655, 1837 WL 1084 (Miss. Err. & App 1837). 
Evidence applied to proceedings in courts of justice consists of those facts or circumstances 
connected with the legal proposition which establish its truth or falsehood. The use of the 
weapon in the case supposed, is the fact or circumstance which establishes or manifests the 
criminal intention.  In a case where the declarations of the deceased are offered to the jury, they 
constitute facts or circumstances to which the law imparts verity, and tend to establish the truth 
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have often articulated a variant of the statement that “the jury is entitled to 
presume that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his 
acts.”185
1. Standard of Proof 
  This encompasses analysis of evidence sufficient to prove not only 
purpose, which is one of the highest levels of mental state, but also a lower 
level of intent, such as knowing. 
The equitable rationale for the forfeiture rule is to prevent defendants 
from benefiting from their own wrongdoing.  The Court was wary, 
however, of a broad rule of admissibility.  If the preliminary admissibility 
threshold is based on the defendant’s wrongdoing, which is the alleged 
criminal conduct at issue in the case, the preliminary judicial evidence 
determination could unduly impinge on the jury’s guilt determination.186  
Thus, the Giles Court did not expand the rule any further than for those 
actions “designed” to prevent a witness from testifying.187
However, courts make preliminary determinations of admissibility 
regularly without commenting on the relative weight or credibility of the 
evidence.  In the evidence context, the most clearly analogous example is 
 
 
of the matter to which they relate. The position, therefore, that the declarations of the deceased, 
in prosecutions for murder, are not admissible as evidence to establish the murder, is wholly 
without foundation. 
Id. at 665–66. 
185 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2698 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 
U.S. 593, 613 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he jury is entitled to presume that a person 
intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.”); Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 
492, 496 (1896) (“‘[A] man who performs an act which it is known will produce a particular 
result is from our common experience presumed to have anticipated that result and to have 
intended it.’”); see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 18, 38 (2d 
ed. 1961) (“There is one situation where a consequence is deemed to be intended though it is 
not desired. This is where it is foreseen as substantially certain.”); MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1962) (stating that a person acts “knowingly” if “the element involves a 
result of his conduct” and “he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause 
such a result”); see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2704 (citing WILLIAMS, supra § 18, at 39) 
(relying on sources at common law for the proposition that the accused “necessarily intends 
that which must be the consequence of the act” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977) (“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout . . . to 
denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the 
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a), at 341 (“[T]he traditional view is that a person who acts . . . intends 
a result of his act . . . when he knows that that result is practically certain to follow from his 
conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.”). 
186 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2686.  The Court noted, “It is akin, one might say, to ‘dispensing 
with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.’”  Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
62). 
187 Id. at 2683–84. 
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the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.188  While the trial judge 
must make an initial assessment that there is sufficient evidence to prove 
the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence,189 it is the jury who 
ultimately decides whether all the evidence proves the conspiracy beyond a 
reasonable doubt.190  In the constitutional context, even by the rule of Giles 
itself, courts may be required to make preliminary determinations based on 
the defendant’s culpability for the charged conduct.191  For example, in a 
judge’s pretrial admissibility determination, the burden for proffering a 
prior testimonial statement of an unavailable witness under the forfeiture 
doctrine would be a preponderance of the evidence, according to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 104(a).192  Even though a jury would apply the beyond a 
reasonable doubt burden at trial, Justices Souter and Ginsburg found this 
too close for comfort, acknowledging the distinction, but calling it a “near 
circularity.”193
 
188 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), cited in 
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 n.6, 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 
189 In making the preliminary admissibility determination, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
require the court to consider the contents of the statement.  However, the contents of the 
statement are “not alone sufficient to establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy and the 
participation therein of the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered.”  
FED. R. EVID. 801(d).  The court must also consider “the circumstances surrounding the 
statement, such as the identity of the speaker, the context in which the statement was made, 
or evidence corroborating the contents of the statement . . . .” Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 694, 710 (1997). 
190 FED. R. EVID. 104. 
191 Justice Scalia concedes this point in Part II.D.2 of the majority opinion, which Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined:  
We do not say, of course, that a judge can never be allowed to inquire into guilt of the charged 
offense in order to make a preliminary evidentiary ruling.  That must sometimes be done under 
the forfeiture rule that we adopt—when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering a 
witness in order to prevent his testimony.  But the exception to ordinary practice that we support 
is (1) needed to protect the integrity of court proceedings, (2) based upon longstanding 
precedent, and (3) much less expansive than the exception proposed by the dissent. 
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 n.6. 
192 Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175.  There is a split in the federal circuits and the states; some 
apply the preponderance standard while other apply a clear-and-convincing standard.  See 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 694, 719 (1997).  In fairness to 
prosecutors and victims who may be unavailable, however, some courts have not held that 
the defendant’s intent be the sole purpose of the conduct.  For example, the Second Circuit 
has held that “[t]he government need not, however, show that the defendant’s sole 
motivation was to procure the declarant’s absence; rather, it need only show that the 
defendant ‘was motivated in part by a desire to silence the witness.’”  United States v. 
Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
193 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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2. “Motive” v. “Intent” 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Giles characterizes the majority as 
incorrectly expanding the requirement for proof of mental state for 
forfeiture from a simple “intent” to prevent the witness from testifying to a 
“purpose” to keep the witness from testifying, in other words that the 
defendant “acts from a particular motive, a desire to keep the witness from 
trial.”194  In describing forfeiture and its predicates, Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion uses terms such as “designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying” or that a “purpose-based definition . . . governed.”195
Certainly, it is harder to prove the more specific mental state of 
“purpose” than the broader mental state of “intent.”
 
196  But the dissent goes 
even farther in suggesting that a negligent state of mind may even be 
sufficient.197  As Justice Breyer states, “no case limits forfeiture to instances 
where the defendant’s purpose or motivation is to keep the witness 
away.”198  The majority tries to overcome this elementary legal logic by 
claiming that the “forfeiture rule” applies, not where the defendant intends 
to prevent the witness from testifying, but only where that is the defendant’s 
purpose, i.e., that the rule applies only where the defendant “acts from a 
particular motive, a desire to keep the witness from trial.”199  Justice Breyer 
emphasized “the law does not often turn matters of responsibility upon 
motive, rather than intent. . . . [a]nd there is no reason to believe that 
application of the rule of forfeiture constitutes an exception to this general 
legal principle.”200  The dissent also emphasized how not one single case 
affirmatively holds that the Constitution limits the application of the 
forfeiture doctrine by requiring proof that the defendant’s purpose or 
motivation was to keep the witness from testifying at trial.201
 
194 Id. at 2698 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referencing id. at 2683–84). 
  Examining 
195 Id. at 2698–99. 
196 Id. (citing State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694, 702–03 (N.M. 2007) (finding it “doubtful 
that evidence associated with the murder would support a finding that the purpose of the 
murder was to keep the victim’s earlier statements to police from the jury”). 
197 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And he does so whether he killed 
her for the purpose of keeping her from testifying, with certain knowledge that she will not 
be able to testify, or with a belief that rises to a reasonable level of probability. The inequity 
consists of his being able to use the killing to keep out of court her statements against him.”). 
198 Id. at 2700. 
199 Id. at 2683–84 (asserting that the terms used to describe the scope of the forfeiture 
rule “suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct 
designed to prevent the witness from testifying” and that a “purpose-based definition . . . 
governed”). 
200 Id. at 2699. 
201 Id. at 2700. 
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the language used by the historical cases, Justice Breyer concludes that the 
words actually suggest a focus on the defendant’s acts202 that cause203 the 
“consequence” of the witness’s absence.204
3. The Development of Mens Rea in Criminal Law 
 
As punishment theory and ideas about criminal culpability have 
developed and evolved over the past several hundred years, legislatures and 
courts have begun to examine more carefully what mental state is required 
for a defendant’s guilt.205
Common law “intent” encompassed a broad range of mental states.  At 
common law, a person “intentionally” caused the social harm if “(1) it is his 
desire (i.e., his conscious object) to cause the social harm; or (2) he acts 
with knowledge that the social harm is virtually certain to occur as a result 
of his conduct.”
  Early in the development of criminal common 
law, courts used several terms, often inconsistently, to describe the mental 
state element—or mens rea—that the law required for culpability.  For 
example, courts used terms such as “malicious,”  “willful,”  “deliberate,” or 
“intentional.”  In addition, courts began to use categorical terms such as 
“specific intent” or “general intent.”  Today in modern American criminal 
law, these terms are still used throughout all penal codes and many of them 
are still used inconsistently. 
206  By contrast, the Model Penal Code separates these 
concepts into two levels of mens rea, “purpose” and “knowing.”207  Both 
are subjective determinations.208
a. Concepts of Mens Rea 
 
In criminal law, the term “intent” is often used to functionally 
distinguish between what some courts call “specific intent” crimes and 
 
202 Id. at 2701.  Justice Breyer noted, “The phrase “by means of” focuses on what the 
defendant did, not his motive for (or purpose in) doing it.”  Id. (referring to Lord Morley’s 
Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L.)). 
203 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2701 (quoting  Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452 (1912)).  
The witness was absent “by the wrongful act of” the accused.  Id. 
204 Id. at 2701 (Breyer, J., dissenting), referring to Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 
473–74 (1900), where the Court spoke of absence “with the assent of” the defendant. 
205 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 117–80 (5th ed. 
2009). 
206 Id. at 121 (citing Thornton v. State, 919 A.2d 678 (Md. 2007)). 
207 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a)-(b) (1985); see also id. at cmt. 2 (citing Walter 
Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L. J. 645 (1917); 
Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 910–11 (1939)). 
208 DRESSLER, supra note 205, at 121–22. 
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“general intent” crimes.209  However, widely inconsistent usage of these 
terms has caused, and continues to cause, confusion and lack of clarity in 
the interpretation and application of criminal law.  Despite the imprecision 
of this terminology, many jurisdictions continue to use this language to 
discuss mens rea.210  In part because of the problematic nature of this 
terminology, the Model Penal Code does not use these words and 
jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Penal Code’s mens rea 
terminology similarly do not typically use these terms.211
There is no universally accepted meaning of “general intent” or 
“specific intent.”  There are, however, a few common approaches.  The first 
could be characterized as the relatively traditional or historical approach.  
Traditionally, courts used the term “general intent” to describe the requisite 
mens rea when no particular mental state is set out in the definition of the 
crime.
 
212  Under this application of mens rea, the prosecution must prove 
only that the actus reus of the crime was performed with a morally 
“blameworthy state of mind.”213  By contrast, traditionally courts used the 
term “specific intent” to describe a mental state which is expressly set out in 
the definition of the crime.214
The second approach is more hierarchical and elemental in its 
interpretation and application of these terms.  Under this approach, courts 
use the term “specific intent” to describe an offense with a higher level 
mens rea term, such as purpose, while using the term “general intent” to 
refer to offenses that permit conviction on less culpable mental states such 
as knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.
  Specific intent encompasses “purpose”—the 
term Justice Scalia has in mind in describing forfeiture. 
215
The third approach is commonly used in modern criminal law.  As 
criminal law has evolved and been codified by legislatures, many statutes 
expressly include an identifiable mens rea element term, or a particular state 





209 Id. at 137–39. 
  Many modern courts use the term “specific intent” to 
210 See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and 
Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 341 (2001) (stating that a majority 
of states and the federal system continue to use the distinction between general and specific 
intent in analyzing criminal culpability). 
211 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt 1 (1985); see also Batey, supra note 210 at 400–01. 





2010] FORFEITURE OF THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT IN GILES 1533 
refer to any mental element which is required to be proven above and 
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus, or conduct, 
of the crime.217  Here are three descriptive examples.  First, if the statute 
“includes an intent or purpose to do some future act,” separate from the 
requisite actus reus of the crime, it may be considered a specific intent 
crime.218  For example, many burglary statutes prohibit a person from 
entering a structure with intent to commit a felony therein.219
Another example includes statutes where the defendant is to “achieve 
some further consequence beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the 
actus reus of the offense,” that is to say, a special motive or purpose for 
committing the actus reus.
 
220  For example, to be culpable for larceny, one 
must take property with intent to permanently deprive the owner of that 
property.  Finally, a statute may be considered a specific intent offense if it 
provides that the actor must be aware of the statutory attendant 
circumstance.221
This third approach uses the term “general intent” to describe a mens 
rea element for any mental state, whether express or implied, in the 
definition of the offense that relates to the acts that constitute the criminal 
offense.
  For example, to be guilty of the crime of receiving stolen 
property, the defendant must know that the property is stolen property. 
222
b. The Model Penal Code 
  More simply, after identifying that a “specific intent” or “strict 
liability” offense is not at issue, courts may categorize all other offenses as 
“general intent” crimes.   
In 1952, the American Law Institute met to create a model code that 
would help guide lawmakers, both legislators and judges, to develop their 
criminal jurisprudence.  The Model Penal Code has endeavored to provide a 
coherent structure to the analysis of mens rea.  Clearly, one of the most 
influential aspects of the Model Penal Code has been the sections related to 
mens rea.  In § 2.02 of the Code, the writers identify and classify four levels 
of mental state: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.223
 
217 Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980); United States v. Blair, 
54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995); Harris v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 183 (Md. 1999)). 
  Each 
mens rea element is defined to apply to the circumstance in which the actor 
218 Id. 
219 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE § 713.1 (2003). 
220 DRESSLER, supra note 205, at 138. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 139. 
223 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985). 
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“acts”224 with respect to a “material element of an offense.”225  In other 
words, the mens rea applies specifically to a material element of conduct, 
result, or attendant circumstance.226
§2.02 General Requirements of Culpability. 
 
*** 
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.227
 
224 Id. at § 1.13 (“General Definitions.  In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is 
required: . . . (2) ‘act’ or ‘action’ means a bodily movement whether voluntary or 
involuntary; (3) ‘voluntary’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.01; (4) ‘omission’ means 
a failure to act[.]”). 
 
225 Id. at § 1.13, § 2.02. 
In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is required: 
(5) “conduct” means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where 
relevant, a series of acts and omissions; 
*** 
 (9) “element of an offense” means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or (iii) 
such a result of conduct as 
(a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; or 
(b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or 
(c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or 
(d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or 
(e) establishes jurisdiction or venue[.] 
(10) “material element of an offense” means an element that does not relate exclusively to the 
statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue, or to any other matter similarly unconnected with (i) 
the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or 
(ii) the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct[.] 
226 See id. at § 2.02(4) (“Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material 
Elements.  When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is 
sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material 
elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, 
unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”). 
227 See also id. at § 2.02(2)(c) and (d) defining “recklessly” and “negligently,” 
respectively.  
(c) Recklessly. 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when.  The risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and 
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation. 
(d) Negligently. 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from 
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(a) Purposely.228
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his 
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and 
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of 
such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. 
(b) Knowingly.229
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he 
is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically 
certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 
To compare, “purposely” focuses on the actor’s “conscious object” to 
engage in conduct or to cause a result, whereas “knowingly” focuses on the 
actor’s “aware[ness].”  Both the “purposely” and “knowingly” categories 
use similar language to define the requisite mental state regarding an 
attendant circumstance: that the actor is “aware” of the existence of such 
circumstances.  However, “purposely” seems to broaden the definition of 
awareness to include instances where the actor simply “believes or hopes 
that [the attendant circumstances] exist.”230
 
his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, 
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves 
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s 
situation. 
  The distinction between 
purpose and knowledge is clarified, in part, by § 2.02(7), which allows the 
requirement of knowledge to be satisfied by the awareness of a high 
probability.  The Code states, “when knowledge of the existence of a 
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if 
228 See also id. § 1.13(11) (“General Definitions.  In this Code, unless a different 
meaning plainly is required: (11) ‘purposely’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and 
equivalent terms such as ‘with purpose,’ ‘designed’ or ‘with design’ have the same 
meaning.”). 
229 See also id. § 2.02(8) (“Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly.  A 
requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly 
with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further 
requirements appears.”). 
230 Id. at § 2.02(2)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). 
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a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes that it does not exist.”231
Even though the Model Penal Code has limited the mental state terms 
to a hierarchy of four levels—purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and 
negligently—it accommodates, in part, a variety of mental state terms that 
preceded it.  Thus, according to the Model Penal Code, “‘intentionally’ or 
‘with intent’ means purposely.”
 
232  Two quotes from the Giles majority 
seem to incorporate this view.  For example, Justice Scalia states, “Every 
commentator we are aware of has concluded the requirement of intent 
‘means that the exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the 
particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.’”233  Further the 
majority writes, “The commentators come out this way because the 
dissent’s claim that knowledge is sufficient to show intent is emphatically 
not the modern view.”234
C. INFERRING INTENT 
  Indeed, it is not the “modern” view.  But this 
point is in complete contradiction to Justice Scalia’s insistence that the 
scope of the confrontation right and its exceptions are defined by 
parameters in place at the time of the founding. 
For a justice system to deprive a criminal defendant of a constitutional 
right, fairness requires an adequate justification.  To that end, all the 
Justices agree that something more than merely causing the witness’s 
absence is required before a defendant is held to have forfeited the right of 
confrontation.  Closely examining each of the five opinions in Giles, one 
can cobble together common ground from the differing viewpoints.  
Although the reasoning for establishing the boundaries of this common 
ground differ, the diversity of rationales actually reinforce one another, 
giving more stable guidance to lower courts. 
The constitutional right grants the right to a procedure: confrontation.  
As with other constitutional rights, the confrontation right can be waived.235
 
231 Id. at § 2.02(7). 
 
232 Id. at § 1.13(12). 
233 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2687–88 (2008) (citing 5 CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:134 (3d ed. 2007); 5 JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.03[7][b] (J. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); 2 KENNETH S. BROWN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 176 (6th 
ed. 2006)). 
234 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2688 (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 5.2 (2d ed. 2003)). 
235 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464 (1938) (holding that a valid waiver is “ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege” by the accused). 
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As in a guilty plea, a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver effectively 
waives the right of confrontation.236  However, as with other constitutional 
rights, a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights may be impliedly 
waived, or forfeited.  For example, those convicted of a felony may lose 
their Second Amendment right to carry guns237 or their right to vote.238  
Similarly, the forfeiture of a right to confrontation by wrongdoing is an 
implied or imputed waiver.  The right of confrontation is imputedly waived 
when a defendant is voluntarily absent from trial239 or is so disruptive to the 
court proceedings that removal from the courtroom is necessary.240
1. The Problem with Purpose 
  The 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception relies upon a similar rationale for 
depriving the defendant of the confrontation right—that the defendant’s 
own conduct justifies the forfeiture. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent correctly observes that basing the forfeiture 
rule on proof of the defendant’s purpose rather than intent “creates serious 
practical evidentiary problems.”241  Given that there is no clear precedent 
that compels the Court to require purpose rather than intent, the dissent 
criticizes the inference the majority draws from an absence in the history of 
cases.  Put simply, there is too little precedent to draw firm conclusions.242  
Indeed, Justice Breyer finds the majority’s requirement of purpose or 
motive to be inconsistent with the “basically ethical objective” of the 
forfeiture exception.243  If the defendant is able to keep the witness from 
testifying in court, he has “take[n] advantage of his own wrong”244
 
236 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969). 
 whether 
237 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008). 
238 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974); see also Angela Behrens, Voting—
Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon 
Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2004). 
239 Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 (1973). 
240 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1970); see also Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 837 (1975) (holding that Sixth Amendment rights are personal to the accused). 
241 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2699 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
242 Id. at 2704 (citing LANGBEIN, supra note 130, at 248). 
243 Id. at 2699.  Justice Breyer highlights that the State only introduced the unconfronted 
statements to rebut the defendant’s affirmative defense of self-defense: “To rebut the 
defendant’s claim of self-defense and impeach his testimony, the State introduced into 
evidence the witness’ earlier uncross-examined statements (as state hearsay law permits it to 
do) to help rebut the defendant’s claim of self-defense.”  Id. at 2695.  While not an actual 
factor in the forfeiture analysis, Justice Breyer seems to consider the broader context of 
equity in the case as a whole.  It was the defendant who raised the very issue that prompted 
the prosecution to use the testimonial evidence. 
244 Id. at 2696.  (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)). 
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the act was done purposely, knowingly, or even with a reasonable belief.  
Using the killing to exclude the victim’s statement from trial constitutes an 
inequity, if done with any of these mental states.245  According to Justice 
Breyer, requiring “evidence that [the defendant] was focused on his future 
trial” produces “incongru[ous]” results.246
In contrast, focusing on intent, the dissent argues for also applying 
forfeiture to a defendant with knowledge of the result of his wrongful 
conduct.
 
247  Most importantly, the dissent argues that “the relevant cases 
suggest that the forfeiture rule would apply where the witness’s absence 
was the known consequence of the defendant’s intentional wrongful act.”248  
Thus, the dissent asserts that the requisite intent is, in fact, established on 
the facts of Giles: The intent to procure the absence of the witness is 
established by proof of knowledge that the defendant’s wrongdoing actions 
will cause the witness’s absence.249
2. Clarifying Muddy Forfeiture Waters 
 
Justice Breyer’s dissent takes the position that unconfronted 
testimonial statements may not have been admissible under the forfeiture 
doctrine at the time of the founding, but are admissible today.250
At the time of the founding, courts discussed three legally sufficient 
ways to establish a witness’s unavailability to testify in person, in court at a 
criminal defendant’s trial.
  He offers 
several alternative explanations for the absence of forfeiture arguments in 
dying declaration cases.  As he suggests, courts have failed to explicitly 
separate three discrete, but interrelated, issues that continue to muddy the 
analytical waters of forfeiture: (a) unavailability of a witness; (b) evidence 
law and its hearsay exceptions, and (c) the constitutional issues presented 
by the Confrontation Clause. 
251
 
245 Id. at 2698. 
  Proving a witness was dead demonstrated that 
246 Id. at 2699.  Setting a lower constitutional barrier for the admission of this evidence 
does not replace the opportunity for jurisdictions to limit the admissibility even further 
through evidence law.  Id. at 2700. 
247 Id. at 2705. 
248 Id. at 2701.  Justice Breyer went on to note, “Rather than limit forfeiture to instances 
where the defendant’s act has absence of the witness as its purpose, the relevant cases 
suggest that the forfeiture rule would apply where the witness’ absence was the known 
consequence of the defendant’s intentional wrongful act.”  Id. 
249 Id. at 2697–98. 
250 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2706. 
251 At the time of the founding, courts also recognized certain evidentiary privileges that 
rendered the witness legally unavailable to testify. See Note, Developments in the Law—
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1455–58 (1985) (citations omitted). 
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it was factually impossible for the witness to appear and testify at trial.252  
Courts could have decided that a witness’s death would be the only 
circumstance in which alternative forms of evidence from the witness 
would be admitted, but they did not.  In addition to death, courts were 
willing to consider evidence other than live testimony from a witness who 
was either “unable to travel” or “kept away by the means or procurement of 
the prisoner.”253  The scope of what circumstances rendered the witness 
sufficiently “unable to travel” at the time of the founding would likely be 
very different from what modern courts would find now.  Finally, even a 
witness who is alive and able to travel may still be legally unavailable to 
testify at trial because the witness was “kept back from appearing by the 
means and procurement” of the defendant.254
Historically, the preferred form of witness evidence was live, in court, 
sworn testimony.  However, if a witness had previously made statements 
out of court and the statements were being offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted within the statements, evidence law generally excluded the 
  Thus, even though it may be 
physically possible for the witness to appear, the witness is practically 
absent and courts found that a legally sufficient reason to characterize the 
witness as unavailable to testify. 
 
For hearsay purposes in modern evidence law, other circumstances also satisfy the 
unavailability requirement.  See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804. 
Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable 
(a) Definition of unavailability. “Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the 
declarant— 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning 
the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement 
despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing 
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure 
the declarant’s  attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), 
(3), or (4), the declarant’s attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, 
inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for 
the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 
252 See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770 
(H.L. 1666); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 425, 429 (4th 
ed. 1762)). 
253 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683. 
254 See GILBERT, supra note 170, at 214–15. 
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reiteration of those statements at trial.  The rationale for exclusion was 
based on assumptions about the credibility and reliability of such 
statements.  Given that such statements were likely not made under oath 
and subject to cross-examination, the information was considered less 
reliable.255
Three exceptions are particularly relevant to our discussion here.  First, 
an exception was made for the witness’s prior testimony.  While perhaps 
not as informative as live testimony, prior testimony was sworn and 
considered sufficiently reliable.
  There were, however, exceptions. 
256  Second, an exception was made for a 
witness’s dying declaration.257  The rationale was that the witness would 
have no motive to lie if he were about ready to meet his maker.258  Third, an 
exception was made for a witness’s prior statement, regardless of the 
content or the circumstances of the statement, if the witness was unavailable 
because he was “kept away by the means or procurement of the 
prisoner.”259
All the other exceptions to the modern hearsay rule are based on the 
assumption that circumstances make the statement sufficiently reliable to be 
fairly considered in accurately determining the defendant’s culpability.
 
260  
The underlying reasoning for the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the 
hearsay rule is completely different.261
 
255 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  “[A]t common law, there existed 
both oath-based and cross-examination-based rationales for the hearsay rule, with the latter 
only becoming dominant around the turn of the 19th century.”  Id. (citing LANGBEIN, supra 
note 
  It is based not on assumptions of the 
130, at 245–246, nn. 291–92). 
256 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250 (1895) (finding no Confrontation Clause 
violation to admit the transcribed copy of the reporter’s stenographic notes of the prior 
testimony of two deceased witnesses at defendant’s retrial for murder because the witnesses 
were sworn and cross-examined). 
257 King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 501, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352–53 (1789). 
258 See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44.  The Court noted, “[T]he sense of impending death is 
presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the 
truth as would the obligation of an oath.”  Id. at 244. 
259 JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 85 (1822). 
260 Anthony Bocchino & David Sonenshein, Rule 804(B)(6)—The Illegitimate Child Of 
The Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule and Confrontation Clause, 73 MO. L. REV. 41, 
41–53 (2008). 
261 Other types of statements, which fall within the definition of hearsay as defined by 
FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c), are expressly excluded from the definition.  Certain prior 
statements by a witness who testifies at trial and admissions by a party-opponent are 
excluded.  Id. at. 801(d).  Admissions by a party-opponent are admissible “on the theory that 
their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system.”  Id. at 801 advisory 
committee note.  Like the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, the rationale of the 
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reliability of the content of the statements, but rather on the overarching 
concept of equity—that it would be unfair to allow a defendant to benefit 
from the defendant’s own effort to interfere with the judicial process. 
Justice Breyer argues for a broader, more permissive constitutional 
rule and then suggests that jurisdictions can adopt a narrower hearsay 
rule.262  While the constitutional right to confrontation may be valued more 
highly than the evidentiary issue of reliability, it does not compel a more 
restrictive standard.263  The dissent’s firm reminder to disentangle the 
constitutional and evidentiary issues is essential.  While related, they must 
be considered separately.  Such separation proves difficult, as even the 
Giles majority reverted back to using evidence law to comment on the 
constitutional question.264  The Giles majority, surprisingly in light of 
Crawford’s directive to separate evidentiary concerns from constitutional 
concerns, attempts to rebut the State’s explanation that the standard for a 
constitutional confrontation forfeiture exception may have been a different 
standard than the evidentiary hearsay forfeiture exception standard, by 
reconnecting the two and stating that they “stem from the same roots.”265
In Crawford, the Court reoriented its perspective on the Confrontation 
Clause back to the founding.  In doing so, the Court determined that the 
focus of the Confrontation Clause was on the procedural guarantee rather 
than the substantive result of reliability.  In conferring a right to a criminal 
defendant to “confront the witnesses against him,” the Confrontation Clause 
was meant to provide the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.  Again, courts could have decided that this rule was absolute but 
they did not.  In Crawford, the Court acknowledged that exceptions existed 
at the time of the founding.  One exception was for dying declarations.  
Another was for circumstances that satisfied a constitutional “forfeiture by 
wrongdoing” standard.  The scope of this exception, in the context of 
constitutional interpretation, is what is at issue in Giles. 
 
 
admissions by a party-opponent rule is based on principles of fairness and equity rather than 
trustworthiness.  See id. 
262 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2700 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
263 The Confrontation Clause does not protect a defendant from unreliable but 
constitutionally-admissible nontestimonial hearsay if it is admissible according to the 
applicable rules of evidence.  This allows the rules of evidence, which are determined by a 
more democratic political process, to set the boundaries of admissibility.  Structurally, this 
allows the courts interpreting the Constitution to set the minimum requirements and the 
legislatures and rule-making bodies have the ability to develop further requirements.  Justice 
Scalia’s own preference for judicial restraint would arguably point him toward a standard 
that would allow the democratic political process to decide these issues. 
264 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687–88. 
265 Id. at 2686 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)). 
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Justice Breyer characterizes the practice of admitting unconfronted 
statements under the forfeiture exception as a recent evidentiary 
development.266  However, some may argue that even Justice Breyer’s 
position does not go far enough to protect victims.  Justice Breyer 
consistently refers to the severe circumstances when a defendant has 
rendered the witness unavailable by killing the witness, stating “the relevant 
circumstances . . . are likely to arise almost exclusively when the defendant 
murders the witness”267 and “[o]rdinarily a murderer would know that his 
victim would not be able to testify at a murder trial.”268  Justice Breyer 
quotes Justice Souter’s concurrence which considered the application of the 
forfeiture exception within the domestic violence context and hypothesized 
using evidence of a “classic abusive relationship” to infer the requisite 
purposive intent for the forfeiture doctrine.269
3. The Forfeiture Exception in Domestic Violence Cases 
 
At its core, forfeiture’s equitable roots are designed to protect against 
wrongdoing.  While all the Justices recognize this goal, the Giles opinions 
place different emphasis on the types of wrongdoing and the consequences 
of each type.  The allegedly criminal conduct at issue at trial may or may 
not be the wrongdoing that constitutes grounds for forfeiture.  There are 
several possible scenarios.  First, a witness’s testimonial statements can 
describe allegedly criminal conduct that is the basis for a criminal charge.  
If followed by the defendant’s subsequent wrongdoing that procures the 
witness’s absence for a court proceeding on the issue of the criminality of 
that prior conduct, the question before the trial court is whether the 
testimonial statements relevant to the initial criminal conduct can be 
admissible.  In a second scenario, the testimonial statements describe 
allegedly criminal conduct that is precisely the conduct claimed to be the 
defendant’s wrongdoing that procures the witness’s absence.  The court 
would need to make a preliminary determination regarding the wrongdoing 
as grounds for admitting the testimonial statement for the culpability of the 
defendant for the same conduct.  Third, like Giles, prior testimonial 
statements can describe a prior, uncharged incident.  If the defendant then 
engages in allegedly criminal conduct that also constitutes the wrongdoing 
which procures the witness’s absence, the issue is the admissibility of the 
 
266 Id. at 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
267 Id. at 2707. 
268 Id. at 2708. 
269 Id. 
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prior statements which relate indirectly to the defendant’s culpability for the 
charged conduct. 
The forfeiture exception is concerned with and related to the 
obstruction of the judicial process.  As the majority fairly emphasizes in 
Giles, the wrongdoing is limited to conduct “designed to prevent a witness 
from testifying.”270  At the core of the forfeiture exception, therefore, is the 
purpose of protecting the integrity of court proceedings.  However, Justice 
Scalia’s narrowing of forfeiture, based on a misreading of the common law, 
goes too far.  Justice Souter’s concurrence adopted a broader approach to 
forfeiture, emphasizing equity.  Similarly, the dissent cited cases in other 
areas of law that illustrate the underlying equitable principle of forfeiture: 
that regardless of the purpose of the defendant’s killing, the result is that the 
defendant is denied any benefit associated with killing.271
In each of the three scenarios described above, the prosecution would 
use the testimonial hearsay to help prove the charged conduct.  Proving the 
defendant had any intent to prevent the declarant from future testimony is 
an easier inference to make in the first two scenarios, and perhaps more 
difficult to make in the third.  However, when the subsequent wrongdoing 
is killing, as in Giles, and both incidents are related to an ongoing 
relationship of violence, the inference of the defendant’s mental state could 
be equally compelling.  As the majority describes, the purpose of a 
forfeiture rule is to prevent “an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, 
intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.”
 
272
Especially in contexts involving complex relationship dynamics 





270 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2686 (Souter, J., concurring).  “But as the evidence amply shows, 
the ‘wrong’ and the ‘evil Practices’ to which these statements referred was conduct designed 
to prevent a witness from testifying.”  Id. 
 courts should not strictly adopt Justice Scalia’s 
271 To analogize, Justice Breyer referenced other areas of law that are based on equitable 
principles and treat wrongdoing similarly.  For example, neither the life insurance proceeds 
nor the assets of the inheritance is given to the killer, irrespective of the finding that the killer 
killed for the insurance or inheritance assets.  Id. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
272 Id. at 2686 (Souter, J., concurring). 
273 In United States v. Miller, a gang-related case, the court stated that “although a 
‘finding that [defendants’] purpose was to prevent [a declarant from] testifying,’ is relevant, 
such a finding is not required.” 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997).   For further discussion of 
this issue, see Yee, supra note 10.  See also Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage 
Done by Crawford v. Washington: Three Constructive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
521, 522 (2010) (citing Witness Intimidation: Showdown in the Streets—Breakdown in the 
Courts, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 25 (1994) (statement of Gerald Shur, Senior Associate Director, 
Office of Enforcement Operations, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
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unjustifiably rigid approach to forfeiture but should use an approach that is 
more flexible and considers intent and equity in the context of institutional 
factors that might motivate a defendant to make a witness unavailable.  This 
would ultimately suggest that a defendant’s knowing conduct that leads to 
unavailability can still trigger forfeiture, even if there is no overt purpose or 
specific intent. 
For example, Professor Tom Lininger has attempted to bring some 
coherence to this area and its implication for domestic violence cases, 
where witnesses are frequently unavailable to testify due to some conduct 
of the defendant.  He proposes that intent be inferred in the following three 
circumstances: violation of a restraining order issued for the victim’s 
protection;274 the commission of a violent act against the victim during the 
pendency of judicial proceedings;275 and when there is a history of “abuse 
and isolation.”276  These factors provide a much more useful approach to 
addressing forfeiture than focusing on a singular assessment of purpose.  
However, given that the confrontation right applies in all criminal cases, not 
just domestic violence,277 the Court has rightly strived to set a standard 
clear enough to be applied, yet flexible enough to address unforeseen 
circumstances.278
 Although six Justices joined the majority and three joined the dissent, 
the nine Justices of the Giles Court actually impliedly share some common 
ground in requiring proof of some mental state for forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.  It is this narrow common ground that lower courts should 
 
 
274 Lininger, supra note 15, at 898. 
275 Id. at 900. 
276 Id.; see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Control Killings, 87 TEX. L. REV. 117 (2009) 
(urging courts to focus on the connection between the pattern of past domestic violence and 
present killing in considering the defendant’s intent to silence the witness). 
277 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.  As Justice Scalia caustically accuses the dissent, “Is the 
suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and 
Crawford described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for 
those crimes that are frequently directed against women?” 
278 Contrast the more severe proposal recommended by Professor Donald Dripps who 
suggests revising the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule to provide a 
presumption of forfeiture when the defendant previously assaulted the witness or the 
witness’s family.  The amended Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) would provide:  
In a criminal case, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused, at any time, 
assaulted an unavailable witness, or threatened to inflict physical harm upon an unavailable 
witness or any member of the witness’s immediate family, the court may presume forfeiture of 
both hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections.  This presumption may be rebutted by proof 
by a preponderance that the accused did not engage in, and did not acquiesce in, wrongdoing 
intended to cause the witness not to testify. 
Dripps, supra note 273, at 557. 
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look to in interpreting and applying Giles’ forfeiture by wrongdoing 
analysis.279  While Justice Scalia’s opinion makes a case for interpreting the 
intent required to be purposive intent only, a fair reading of the common 
law at the time of the founding construes intent to encompass both 
purposive and knowing mental states.280  Such a reading is not inconsistent 
with the analysis by Justices Souter and Ginsburg in their concurrence, 
which acknowledged that the historical evidence was not clear.281  
However, as Justice Souter stated, “Equity demands something more than 
this near circularity before the right to confrontation is forfeited, and more 
is supplied by showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying.”282  
Moreover, the three Justices joined in the dissent share this common 
ground: that the forfeiture doctrine requires the prosecution to prove the 
defendant’s intent.283  But the dissent broadly outlines the government’s 
burden, stating “that the prosecution in such a case need show no more than 
intent (based on knowledge) to do so.”284
The common ground among a majority of the Justices in Giles 
becomes even firmer in the domestic violence context.
   
285
 
279 In Giles, four of the six Justices who joined the majority wrote or joined concurring 
opinions.  One scholar has suggested that a simple concurrence “should be granted 
precedential weight to the extent that it is numerically necessary to procure a majority and 
that it is compatible with the majority opinion.”  Igor Kirman, Standing Apart to Be a Part: 
The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 
2805 (1995).  Justices Souter and Ginsburg were necessary to form a majority in Giles and 
the equitable approach discussed in their concurrence is compatible with Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion. 
  Importantly, the 
 Note also, as is well-established, an opinion of the Supreme Court with no clear majority 
on both result and reasoning should, at a minimum, be read narrowly.  Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [the majority], the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on 
the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotations omitted)).  For a normative defense of this 
“narrowest grounds” approach to constitutional interpretation see Maxwell L. Stearns, The 
Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. 
COMMENT. 321 (2000) (using social choice theory to explain why the narrowest-ground 
approach to interpreting plurality and fragmented vote cases is desirable). 
280 See supra notes 205–222 and accompanying text. 
281 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
282 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring). 
283 Id. at 2701–02 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
284 Id. at 2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
285 Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg) (supporting Part II.E of the 
majority opinion); see Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: 
An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552 (2007); Tuerkheimer, supra 
note 276; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic 
Violence Context,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711 (2009). 
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majority decision itself specifically addresses the application of its 
interpretation of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule in the domestic violence 
context.286
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to 
outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or 
cooperation in criminal prosecutions.  Where such an abusive relationship culminates 
in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to 
isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or 
cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible 
under the forfeiture doctrine.  Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade 
the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as 
would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been 
expected to testify.
  Justice Scalia himself observed: 
287
Although the majority quibbles with the dissent, denying that such an 
analysis is “nothing more than ‘knowledge-based intent,’”
 
288 the semantic 
differences cannot overshadow the fundamental agreement demonstrated by 
this description.  Whether one calls it inferred intent or knowledge-based 
intent, practically this includes a mental state that is broader than explicit 
purpose, but excludes a mental state that is only objectively negligent.  As 
the concurrence further describes the level of intent required in a domestic 
abuse case, the Sixth Amendment simply requires “some degree of intent to 
thwart the judicial process[.]”289
To illustrate what evidence would suffice to prove that requisite level 
of intent the concurrence suggests that “the element of intention would 
normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic 
abuser in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the 
victim from outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the 
judicial process.”
 
290  The three Justices joined in the dissent quote this 
language in agreement,291
a showing of domestic abuse is sufficient to call into play the protection of the 
forfeiture rule in a trial for murder of the domestic abuse victim.  Doing so when, in 
fact, the abuser may have had other matters in mind apart from preventing the witness 
from testifying, is in effect not to insist upon a showing of “purpose.”
 commenting further that  
292
 
286 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692–93. 
 
287 Id. at 2693.  The Court sent the case back to allow the trial court to consider the intent 
of the defendant on remand.  Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring). 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 2708. (“Consequently, I agree with this formulation, though I would apply a 
simple intent requirement across the board.”). 
292 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Judicial philosophies are based in part on the degree to which the 
judge’s interpretive method gives weight to the extra-textual sources of 
information and the degree to which the judge is dedicated to preserving the 
application of the original meaning in the present context.  As a textualist 
and an originalist, Justice Scalia works to identify the original meaning of 
the constitutional text and then attempts to apply that historical meaning to 
the present-day issue before the Court.  Other Justices on the Court have 
been less reliant on history as a primary source for information about the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.293  For example, Justice Breyer’s 
jurisprudence is founded on the idea that the Constitution is a document that 
was written to adapt to the present circumstances of an issue before the 
Court by the Court’s consideration of the purposes of the law and the likely 
consequences of its interpretation.294




As I have argued in this Article, the common law principles, best 
understood through the history, do not support Justice Scalia’s inference 
about how the common law of forfeiture applies.  In this recent opinion in 
the Crawford line of cases, Justice Scalia may have revealed himself as not 
only a faint-hearted originalist, but as a faint-hearted scholar of the common 
  This label has generated much criticism, 
particularly within the originalist camp of constitutional interpretation.  
Whatever one’s larger views of constitutional methodology, however, to the 
extent constitutional interpretation relies on descriptions of the common law 
it should make every effort to describe it fairly and accurately.  In the case 
of forfeiture, the common law foundations of Justice Scalia’s constitutional 
interpretation are based on an absence of cases, not on well-established 
common law principles.  That is not a very solid foundation for any 
originalist method to discern constitutional meaning. 
 
293 For example, Justice Thomas wrote, “There is virtually no evidence of what the 
drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 n.8 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).  In Green, Justice Harlan noted, “[T]he Confrontation 
Clause comes to us on faded parchment.  History seems to give us very little insight into [its] 
intended scope . . . .”  Green, 399 U.S. at 173–74 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
294 See, e.g., JUSTICE STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (describing an interpretive approach based on the 
principle of “active liberty” which endeavors to enable democracy); Stephen Breyer, On 
Handguns and the Law, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug. 19, 2010 (excerpt from STEVEN 
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010)) (discussing how history 
is an insufficient resource for interpreting the Constitution)).   
295 Scalia, supra note 19. 
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law.  In the context of longstanding legal processes, like the criminal law, if 
these premises are not an accurate basis for an originalist interpretation of 
the Confrontation Clause, that interpretation is left with a shifting and weak 
foundation.  In fact, the forfeiture doctrine has a long history and its 
common law foundations are not nearly as narrow as Justice Scalia 
suggested.  Given that the Court’s decision in Giles is itself highly 
fragmented on its reasoning, lower courts and litigants have a firm ground 
for reading the decision on the narrowest grounds and interpreting forfeiture 
more expansively than Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Giles appears to 
invite.  Considering Justice Scalia’s own example regarding domestic 
violence cases,296
 
296 See supra note 
 it would seem especially important that courts be aware 
that “design” or “purpose” can be established by circumstantial evidence 
that the witness’s absence is a known consequence of the defendant’s acts. 
287. 
